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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction and Summary 
 
Why are some countries much richer than others? Why do some economies 
grow faster than others? Economists have asked these trite yet crucial 
questions for more than one century. Traditional neoclassical growth theory, 
following Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), emphasizes the 
effect of factor accumulation on economic performance. In these models, 
cross-country differences in income per capita are due either to differences 
in the saving rate or other exogenous parameters. More recent research 
endogenizes steady-state growth and technical progress. For instance, Lucas 
(1988) emphasizes the externality arising from human capital in production, 
and Aghion et al. (1992) shed light on the role that destructive innovation 
plays for economic growth. Although these traditional economic studies 
provide much insight into the mechanics of economic growth, some 
economists don’t agree that these theories provide a fundamental 
explanation for economic growth. For instance, North and Thomas (1973, p. 
2) argue: “the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, 
education, capital accumulation etc.) are not causes of growth; they are 
growth.” In their view, a given economic institution provides the 
fundamental explanation for economic growth, because it shapes incentives 
for key actors in a society. In particular, institutions influence investments in 
physical and human capital as well as the development of new technologies.  
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Acemoglu et al. (2004b) further point out that economic institutions are 
determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Hence, 
the relevant sources of economic growth can be traced back to political 
institutions and income or wealth inequality.     
 
This thesis consists of three essays which investigate the role that inequality 
or political institutions play for economic growth. Before summarizing each 
essay, we will motivate their respective theme. 
  
Table 1.1 presents the possible linkage between political institutions and 
economic growth. We collect nominal GDP-data in USD from the United 
Nations. The civil liberty index is taken from Freedom House, a non-profit 
organization which publishes surveys detailing state of civil liberties, 
political rights, and economic freedom every year. According to Freedom 
House, civil liberties allow for the freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state. The Civil liberty index is a 
widely used measurement of the kind of political institutions surrounding 
the economic environment. The index ranges from 1.0 to 7.0, where 1.0 
reflects the most free and 7.0 the least free rating. There are 157 countries 
whose data are available. Since there is no commonly accepted criterion for 
what constitutes a developing country, we simply define developing 
countries as those countries whose nominal GDP per capita falls below the 
average level of these 157 countries in any given year. In 1970, there are 
113 developing countries and 44 developed countries. In the second part of 
the table, we classify all 157 countries into 6 categories according to their 
average civil liberty index between the years 1972 and 1974 (C.L. in Table 
1.1). 
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Table 1.1:  Political Institutions and Economic Growth 
GDP per capita 
[USD]  Observations (total 157) 
Civil 
Liberty 
Index 
 
 1972-74 1970 2004 
Growth 
rate 70-
04 [% 
p.a.] 
Variance 
of 
Growth 
rate 
Developing 
countries 
113 4.56 300 2370 4.78 6.41 
Developed 
countries 
44 2.81 2446 28550 6.66 4.71 
C.L. 7~6 42 6.38 442 2764 4.37 8.03 
C.L. 5.9~5 27 5.22 472 4767 4.46 6.28 
C.L. 4.9~4 18 4.28 414 3104 4.44 5.49 
C.L. 3.9~3 23 3.26 781 6917 6.00 4.32 
C.L. 2.9~2 28 2.08 1175 14278 6.07 5.51 
C.L. 1.9~1 19 1.02 2733 34977 7.46 0.89 
Average  4.07 881 6418 5.84 6.62 
 
Notes: Nominal GDP per capita is taken from the United Nations Statistics Division, and 
the Civil Liberty index (C.L.) originates from Freedom house. See the text for 
definitions and further details. 
 
Our findings are as follows. First, developing countries tend to have a more 
dictatorial political institution than developed countries. Table 1.1 shows 
that the average value of the civil liberty index among developing countries 
is 4.56, whereas that of developed countries is 2.81. According to the index, 
most west European nations and inhabitants of the United States of America 
enjoy much more freedom than those living in China, other former 
communist countries, South Korea, Iran, and many Arab or African 
countries. The index takes on 1.0 for the former group of countries; it lies 
between 6.0 and 7.0 for the latter group. Second, the long-run growth rate of 
developing countries is lower than that of developed countries (4.78% vs. 
6.66% p.a. between 1970 and 2004), and the variance of the long-run 
growth rate among developing economies is higher than that of rich 
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countries (6.41 vs. 4.71). This implies no absolute convergence of income in 
the world. Some developing countries even have a negative long-run growth 
rate. E.g., the nominal GDP of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
decreased from 350 USD in 1970 to 115 USD in 2004. Other developing 
countries are indeed approaching the status of being developed. E.g., the 
nominal GDP of South Korea increased from 291 USD in 1970 to 14,266 
USD in 2004. Finally, we find from the second part of table 1.1 that less 
freedom tends to accompany lower income, a lower long-run growth rate, 
and a higher variance of the growth rate. In particular, the most dictatorial 
countries (C.L. 6~7 ) have a variance of more than 8, whereas the most 
democratic countries (C.L. 1~9.1 ) tend to have a very stable long-run 
growth rate (variance 0.89). These figures suggest that a benevolent dictator 
is much more important for stimulating growth in dictatorial countries than 
a good president is in a democracy. Hence, it is important to ask which role 
the dictatorial government plays for the economic performance in 
developing countries, and why some dictators are benevolent and others are 
not. Mainstream economic theory has paid little to no attention to this 
aspect. 
 
Chapter 2 formulates a game-theoretic model between a dictator and the 
people to find underlying determinants of dictatorial behavior. At first, we 
assume that the engine of economic growth is private investment. It can 
increase the productivity of individuals who invest and also the aggregate 
technology level. Then we define a good dictator as one who gives social 
transfer to the people and thereby stimulates future investment and output. 
The bad dictator just taxes her citizens and keeps tax revenue for her own 
consumption. The degree of goodness is measured by the amount of money 
transferred from the dictator to citizens. The so-called good dictator decides 
to give social transfer to stimulate private investment to obtain more income 
due to taxes in the future. Hence, both good and bad dictators are motivated 
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by the same goals. However, the citizens’ response to the dictator’s behavior 
determines whether a dictator should act as a good or bad dictator. Being 
good or bad is not an inherent property of the dictator. The dictator and the 
citizens always act in their own best interest. 
 
This chapter builds on McGuire and Olson (1996). According to these 
authors, a good dictator implements growth-enhancing policies in order to 
increase taxes in the future. Our research extends their work by emphasizing 
the risk involved for a dictator with choosing a growth-enhancing policy: 
while such policies can raise additional tax revenues in the short-run, they 
also increase the likelihood of a revolution which can lead to the eventual 
overthrow of the dictator. Chapter 2 has three main findings. First, the return 
of private investment has a negative effect on the behavior of dictators. In a 
country where citizens can earn much through private investment, the 
dictator has little incentive to pass on social transfer to citizens. Second, 
contrary to McGuire and Olson (1996) we find that a long life-time of a 
dictator does not always induce her to act benevolently. With a longer life-
time, she will be more concerned with the likelihood of a revolution. 
Finally, we distinguish two different effects of economic performance on 
democratization. If a good economic performance is achieved by 
technological progress, then it will lead to a speedy democratization. This 
result coincides with the empirical research of Barro (1997). However, if a 
country becomes richer because of more natural resources, then the good 
economic performance impedes political transition. This result is consistent 
with Ross (2001), who finds that oil impedes democracy.  
 
The thesis’ second main topic is the relationship between economic growth 
and income or wealth inequality. Although the wealth inequality is more 
relevant in theoretical modelling, most empirical studies use income 
inequality data as a proxy for wealth inequality because of the scarcity of 
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available data on the distribution of wealth. “It is generally argued that this 
is unlikely to be a major problem since both measures of inequality 
generally vary together in cross-sections.” (Aghion et al. 1999).  
 
Table 1.2:  South Korea vs. Philippines 
 S. Korea Philippines 
Nominal GDP p.c. 70 (UN) 291 183 
Nominal GDP p.c. 04 (UN) 14266 1059 
Nominal growth rate 70-04 p.a. 11.44% 5.16% 
Real GDP p.c. 70 (BL) 1680 1369 
Real GDP p.c. 89 (BL) 6206 1726 
Real Growth rate 70-89 p.a. 6.88% 1.22% 
Civil Liberty Index 70-72(BL) 6 5.333 
Population 70(UN) 31.9 Mio. 36.6 Mio. 
Average schooling years 70(BL) 5.583 4.833 
Enrollment ratio for Primary Edu. 70(BL) 100% 100% 
Enrollment ratio for Secondary Edu. 70(BL) 42% 46% 
Enrollment ratio for High Edu. 70(BL) 8% 19.9% 
Population share in Capital 60(Lu) 28% 27% 
GDP share of Industry 60(Lu) 20% 28% 
Ratio of Gov Consumption to GDP 70-74(BL) 4.2% 11.7% 
Ratio of Investment to GDP 70-74(BL) 24% 14% 
Gini 65(DS) 0.34 0.51 
Gini 71(DS) 0.36 0.49 
 
Notes: The term XX behind a variable denotes a specific year (e.g., Nominal GDP p.c. 70 
is nominal GDP per capita in 1970), and the term XX-XX denotes a period. GDP 
is in USD. The sources of data are in parentheses. UN is United Nations Statistics 
Division. BL is Barro and Lee Database (1994). Lu is Lucas (1993). DS is 
Deininger and Squire (1996). See the text for further details. 
 
This theme is motivated by the following puzzle which Lucas (1993) and 
Bénabou (1996) raised. Table 1.2 shows the main economic aggregates of 
two East Asian countries: the Philippines and South Korea. In the early 
1970s, they were similar in their GDP per capita, the average education 
level, the size of their population, and the degree of urbanization and 
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industrialization. According to the civil liberty index, their political 
institutions are also very similar. Yet, they have had dramatically different 
growth rates over the last 30 years. While South Korea grew at 11.44% per 
year, the Philippines have only grown 5.16%. Today, South Korea’s GDP 
per capita is about 14 times higher than that of the Philippines. 
 
Observed differences in the growth rates can be explained by the theory in 
Chapter 2. The dictator of South Korea is more benevolent than the one in 
the Philippines in that she spent less on consumption than the Philippines 
(the ratio of government consumption to GDP is 4.2% in S. Korea and 
11.7% in the Philippines), and induced more investment (the ratio of 
investment to GDP is 24% in S. Korea versus 14% in the Philippines). 
Moreover, there also are reasons other than different dictators. Looking 
beyond first moments, we find significant differences in the countries’ 
income distribution. The Gini coefficient was seventeen percentage points 
higher in the Philippines than in South Korea in 1965 (13 percentage points 
higher in 1971). This difference equals 1.8 standard deviations in the world 
distribution of the Gini coefficient, or 2.5 among East-Asian countries. 
Similar results can be found if we use the Gini coefficient for farmland 
(Taylor and Hudson 1972), which is a proxy for wealth inequality. 
 
This fact suggests that the answer to the puzzle, why two similar economies 
could grow so differently, may lie beyond the representative agent 
framework. In other words, the distribution of income/wealth, instead of the 
average level, matters. Since the early 1990s, more and more cross country 
evidence (Berg and Sachs 1987, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Alesina and 
Rodrik 1994, Clark 1995) supports the prediction that income inequality has 
a negative impact on long-run growth rates.  
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Such a result comes as a surprise both with regard to traditional theories in 
the field, and with regard to the channels through which inequality might 
affect economic growth. According to the comprehensive survey of 
Bénabou (1996), there are three main channels: (i) imperfect capital 
markets, (ii) political economy aspects, and (iii) social conflict. All of these 
channels address the impact of the wealth/income distribution on 
investment. We will refer to them as the supply-side effects. Although these 
theories – the imperfect capital market theory in particular – are  considered 
as plausible by many economists, the evidence in table 1.2 raises doubt 
concerning the prediction that more equally distributed initial income in 
South Korea in 1960’s leads to a higher level of human capital investment 
which, in turn, induced a higher long run growth rate. In 1970, the 
Philippines had a somewhat higher enrollment ratio for secondary and 
higher education. That implies that inequality may affect output through 
other channels besides the supply-side effects. In the literature, Murphy et 
al. (1989) at first introduce, and then Zweimüller et al. (2000, 2005) extend 
the demand-side effect, i.e., inequality can affect output through the demand 
for consumption goods.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4 follow the work of Zweimüller et al. (2000, 2005) and 
illustrate the demand channel through which inequality affects growth. The 
main idea is based on the vertical differentiated goods market, which was 
originally introduced by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). Profit of 
innovation determines its incentive. The profit of a new differentiated good 
comes from the willingness to pay and the market share. Both of them will 
be affected by the distribution of income. Inequality may supply enough 
rich consumers to buy new luxury or higher quality goods. But on the other 
side, inequality induced by a relative small market size impedes also the 
spread of new or better quality goods. Hence, the effect of distribution on 
innovation is not a priori clear. 
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We assume an economy with two kinds of individuals, the poor and the rich. 
Hence, the Gini coefficient is decomposed into two variables, namely, the 
relative wealth of the poor and the population share of the poor. The 
purpose of our research is to show that these two variables might have 
different effects on economic growth. Thus, the simple regression of the 
Gini coefficient on the long-run growth rate is able to generate neither an 
unambiguous empirical result, nor a useful policy recommendation.  
 
In chapter 3 we only focus on the demand-side effect. We introduce the 
interdependent relationship between the relative wealth of the poor and the 
population share of the poor in an overlapping generations model. We 
assume the poor can become rich through education. If the wealth difference 
between the poor and the rich becomes larger, then more individuals have 
incentives to undergo education. Hence, the population share of the rich 
increases. This incentive consideration reflects the traditional argument that 
inequality is growth-enhancing. However, traditional theory considers the 
supply-side effect. I.e., the larger human capital investment, the greater 
output is. We concentrate on the effect of distribution on the demand for 
high quality goods. Since there are only two kinds of consumers, at most 
two top quality goods can survive in the quality goods’ market. Hence, 
chapter 3 considers an oligopolistic market for quality goods. After a 
successful innovation, the newly invented quality goods enter into the 
market, the current best quality good becomes the second best one and the 
current second best quality good is driven out of the market. Hence, the 
return of a successful innovation comes from two parts: profits of the best 
quality goods until one innovation succeeds and profits of the second best 
quality goods until two higher qualities are invented.  
 
Our results show that there exists a separating equilibrium, where the best 
quality good is sold to the rich and the second best good to the poor. In this 
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equilibrium, a decrease in the relative wealth of the poor implies that more 
individuals undergo education and become rich. Hence, the best quality 
good has a larger market share and the return of innovation increases. 
Consequently, the innovation rate rises. In this sense, inequality is good for 
the innovation rate. If the population share of the poor increases, the best 
quality supplier faces a smaller market share. Hence, there is less incentive 
to invent. The innovation rate decreases. The inequality induced by a large 
population share of the poor is bad for the innovation rate. 
 
In chapter 4, we combine the above quality improvement model and the 
neoclassical production function. Thus, the impact of wealth inequality on 
economic growth is through the supply of human capital as well as the 
demand for better quality goods. According to the imperfect capital markets 
theory, larger inequality of wealth leads to a lower aggregate supply of 
human capital. Hence, the supply-side effect is negative. This result comes 
directly from the assumption of the neoclassic production function. 
Similarly as in chapter 3, we investigate the demand-side effect of wealth 
inequality in quality improvement model. In the separating equilibrium, the 
relative wealth of the poor has a negative effect on economic growth. And 
in the pooling equilibrium, the effect is positive. Hence, in general, there is a 
non-linear relationship between the relative wealth of the poor and 
economic growth. This result is partly consistent with recent empirical 
findings (Chen 2003). Contrary to the relative wealth of the poor, the 
population share of the poor has either negative effect, in the separating 
equilibrium, or no effect, in the pooling equilibrium, on economic growth.  
 
The results of chapters 3 and 4 have an important implication for economic 
policy. In a country where the separating equilibrium is overwhelming and 
the goal of government policy is to achieve both an increase in economic 
growth and a decrease in inequality, one should consider decreasing the 
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population share of the poor but not directly redistributing from the rich to 
the poor.  
 
Finally, chapter 5 addresses some questions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
When will a Dictator Be Good? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Economists have realized the importance of political institutions in shaping 
economic performance. Most academic studies of political economy (e.g. 
Shepsle and Weingast 1995, Cox 1997, Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2003) 
focus on the democratic political system, where formal political institutions, 
such as the constitution, the rule of law, and the election system, are already 
well advanced. However, few studies shed light on dictatorship, although 
most people on earth live in such regimes.1 A puzzling phenomenon in 
dictatorial economies is that they can achieve dramatically different 
economic growth rates. While East Asian dragons have grown 8-10% per 
year for almost 30 years, many African countries suffered from recessions 
in the same period, although both East Asia and African countries are 
controlled by some dictators. (The study of East Asia, see Collins and 
Bosworth 1996; the study of Africa, see Easterly and Levine 1997) 
  
A simple comparison between dictators in East Asian dragons and those in 
African or South American countries implies that the behavior of 
                                                 
1 Recent works in this line include e.g. Wintrobe (1998), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), 
Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2004a).   
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autocracies might be important for the fortune of nations. (For formal 
research on the relationship between the political institution and economic 
growth, see Acemoglu et al. 2004b, and Glaeser et al. 2004) The good 
dictator invests in public education and infrastructure, establishes the rule of 
law to encourage private investment, subsidizes R&D, and so on. However, 
the bad one simply transfers a large fraction of social wealth to herself. One 
classic case of the bad dictator is Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo from 1965 to 1997. According to Acemoglu et al. 
(2004a), in the 1970s, 15-20 percent of the operating budget of the state 
went directly to Mobutu. In 1977 Mobutu’s family took 71 million USD 
from the National Bank for personal use and by the early 1980s his personal 
wealth was estimated at 5 billion USD. In 1980, GDP of Congo is only 14.7 
billion USD according to the databank of UN.  
 
Here, the good dictator invests more in public projects than the bad, 
although both are willing to tax citizens. It is of interest to ask why some 
dictators are good and others are bad.2 This question is important for 
economists, because the type of dictator determines the kind of economic 
performance observed. It is also important for politicians, since good 
economic performance induces early democratization, according to the 
Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis,3 which states that prosperity stimulates 
democracy. Although the impact of democracy on economic performance is 
far from reaching a consensus among economists,4 the reverse causality--the 
Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis--has shown strong empirical regularity in many 
empirical studies (e.g. Barro 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003).  
 
                                                 
2 Sah (1991) believes that dictatorship is a risky investment.  
3 We owe this terminology to Barro 1999.  
4 Barro (1997) points out that there is a non-linear relation between democracy and 
economic growth. Whereas democracy is growth enhancing in the young period, it is bad 
for further economic growth when democracy exceeds beyond a certain point. 
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The present article assumes a dichotomic world, where democracy is 
defined by the one-person-one-vote majority voting system (Huntington 
1991, Schumpeter 1947) and dictatorship (or autocracy, or non-democracy, 
we treat all as equal for simplicity) means that one person holds all political 
power. We provide a theoretical model to illustrate underlying determinants 
of a dictator’s behavior. Furthermore, we emphasize the trade-off faced by 
the dictator between economic benefits from a growth-enhancing policy in 
the short run and the shorter life-time of a dictator due to earlier revolution, 
which is induced by economic growth in the long-run. This simple model is 
based on three important components. 
 
First, we argue that economic growth is generated by decentralized 
investment. Individuals’ investment increases their private productivity. 
This private investment has a positive external effect on the aggregate 
technology level. The more individuals invest, the higher the aggregate 
technology level.  
 
Second, consistent with the literature, we assume that the political power 
affects economic performance through the redistribution policy. The 
redistribution policy in the current model is summarized by a two-
dimensional vector, which consists of the tax rate and the social transfer. A 
dictator can invest in public education, infrastructure or provide direct 
subsidies to individuals. All of them can be considered as the social transfer, 
which encourages individuals to invest. Hence, the social transfer policy 
measures the goodness of the dictator. Throughout the current paper, the 
terms bad, good and better are merely shorthand for statements about the 
amount of the social transfer. Following individuals’ production, a dictator 
sets the tax rate and then collects tax revenue. Hence, the promise to reduce 
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the tax rate in a dictatorship isn’t credible5. This assumption simplifies the 
analysis and enables us to concentrate on the key question of this paper: 
Why do some dictators transfer more to citizens, thereby inducing higher 
growth rates, while others concern themselves more with their own 
consumption and thus less social transfer. We argue that both good and bad 
dictators behave to benefit themselves. The citizens’ response to the 
dictator’s behavior determines whether a dictator should act as a good or 
bad one. A good dictator implements a social transfer policy because she 
can tax more. In the short run this is the economic benefit from a growth-
enhancing policy.   
 
Third, democracy is growth-enhancing in the current model, because it 
protects decentralized investment from expropriative taxation. Hence, it is 
better than any dictatorship under scrutiny.6 In a dictatorship, the higher the 
aggregate technology level, the greater the taxed income is. In turn, citizens 
have greater incentives of political transition. Nevertheless, the ruler 
impedes this political transition because the loss of political power coincides 
simultaneously with the loss of economic benefits. A good dictator 
encourages higher private investments, thereby inducing a higher aggregate 
technology level in the future. Consequently, democracy is more attractive 
to citizens. It leads to earlier democratization, which constitutes the cost to a 
good dictator. 
 
                                                 
5 According to Acemoglu (2000), democratization is the strategic decision of political elites 
to prevent revolution. As long as elites hold political power, the citizen can not trust that 
elites will undergo a pro-citizen redistribution for ever. Hence, citizens would like to revolt 
if the revolution condition is satisfied. For the elite, it is better to democratize when she 
faces the risk of revolution. I follow his idea and assume that the taxation is after the private 
investment. Hence, the promise to reduce the taxation is incredible, as long as the 
dictatorship does not change.   
6 See Proposition 3, assumption A.2 ensures that democracy is better than a dictatorship in 
the current model. 
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We find that the dictator is good if the highest tax rate is sufficiently high 
and the return rate of private investment is sufficiently low. The goal of the 
dictator to foster economic growth is to tax more in future. If the highest tax 
rate is great enough, the dictator expects to tax more. Hence, she is faced 
with a large incentive to become good. On the other hand, if the return rate 
of private investment is higher (e.g., because of more oil or other natural 
resources), then the initial investment level is higher. Hence, the dictator has 
lower incentives to encourage private investment. In this sense, oil and other 
natural resources have a negative effect on the behavior of a dictator.  
 
Contrary to McGuire and Olson (1996), we point out that the longer life-
time does not always give the dictator the incentive to do better. Their paper 
considers only the benefit of public investment (similar to social transfer), 
whereas the current paper emphasizes the trade-off between economic 
benefits in the short run and the shorter life-time in the long-run. If citizens 
face a higher revolution cost, i.e., the dictator can live longer, then her 
positive social transfer policy can generate more benefits for her, in turn, 
she has a higher incentive to be a good one. This is the argument of 
McGuire and Olson (1996). Furthermore, by recognizing this effect, we 
point out, that her positive social transfer will induce a higher economic 
growth rate in the long-run, which leads to an earlier revolution. If the 
dictator has a longer life-time, she will be more concerned with the negative 
effect of her social transfer policy. Hence, her social transfer is not 
necessarily larger, if she lives longer. 
 
Another novel result is that we illustrate the different effects of good 
economic performance on democratization. If the return rate of the private 
investment increases due to a new discovery of natural resources, such as 
oil, then more individuals will invest. In turn, the country can achieve good 
economic performance. However, good economic performance does not 
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imply inducing sooner democratization, vice versa, citizens have lower 
incentive to revolt and the dictator has also lower incentive to be good. If 
good economic performance is achieved by the higher technology level, 
then we can observe the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. Hence, this simple 
model is consistent not only with respect to the empirical results of Barro 
(1997), but also that of Ross (2001), which finds that oil impedes 
democracy. 
  
The present paper connects two different strands of the literature. First, the 
literature of political economy studies taxation and public investment by 
dictators (e.g., McGuire and Olson 1996) facing the potential contest of 
other political groups (e.g., Tornell and Lane 1999, Collier 2001, Konrad 
2002). However, this literature does not correlate developments in a 
dictatorial nation with potential democratization. The theory of 
democratization in the framework of political economy frequently focuses 
on the pure redistributive model, for instance, Therborn (1977), 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). 
However, they don’t distinguish between different dictators in the sense of 
growth-enhancing policies. Zak and Feng (2003) are more closely related to 
the current paper because they study also the relationship between economic 
growth and political transition. However, they emphasize the acceleration of 
democratization in different regimes’ policies. In contrast to their work, we 
focus on the conditions under which different regimes (good or bad) exist. 
On the other hand, the literature of the new growth theory studies the impact 
of democracy on economic growth, e.g. Barro (1997, 1999) Kurzman et al. 
(2002), or the impact of redistribution policy on growth, e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), Benabou (1996, 2002), but few consider that the most 
growth-enhancing policies are implemented by dictators in non-democratic 
societies.   
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I will present the set-up of the 
model. In section 2.3, we study the exogenous growth case without the 
positive external effect of investments. Then we introduce the 
democratization process in section 2.4. In section 2.5, the external effect is 
investigated, in order to establish the relationship between political 
transition and economic growth. Moreover, we study the behavior of 
dictators who face the pressure of political transition. In section 2.6, the 
main results are summarized. 
 
2.2 The Set-up of the Model 
 
There are two types of political states: dictatorship and democracy, and two 
kinds of agents: the ruler and citizens. Citizens invest in a project which can 
increase their productive ability and produce output using this ability, 
whereas the ruler taxes the output after production in dictatorship. The 
dictator can choose to be good or bad. The good dictator shares a part of the 
tax income with some citizens, whereas the bad dictator consumes all tax 
revenue by herself. Democracy is characterized by equality: every citizen 
has the same political power to determine the tax rate and receives the same 
amount of transfers. 
 
2.2.1 The Economic Environment 
 
We consider an infinite horizon economy with two types of agents: a ruler 
and a continuum Λ  of citizens. Citizens live infinitely long, but the ruler 
lives only if not killed in a revolution. Citizens are born with different 
ability levels which are invariant over time. These ability levels are assumed 
to be independent realizations of a continuous random variable taking 
values in the unit interval ]1,0[ . In that case we can also take ]1,0[=Λ  as 
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indexing the set of citizens. This allows us to refer to citizens by their ability 
level: citizen Λ∈a  is that citizen with ability level a . For convenience, we 
assume a uniform distribution of abilities on [0,1]. 
 
The production function of citizen a  in period t  is given by:  
 
                                       atItat NaAy λ= , 1>λ                                          ( 2.1 ) 
 
where tA  represents the aggregate technology level, N  is natural resources 
per capita, and atI  is an indicator function of investment in period t . 1=atI  
means that individual a  invests at t , whereas 0=atI  means that he doesn’t 
invest. The investment cost is teA , 0>e , and it enables the investor to 
increase his productivity by the factor λ . Hence, the return rate of private 
investment for individual a  is ( )a
e
N 1−λ . If his return rate is greater than 1, 
then he invests. This assumption implies that the private investment decision 
of individual a  depends on his own productivity a , but not the aggregate 
technology level. The investment fully depreciates within one period. 
Hence, a citizen needs to invest in each period if investment is valuable to 
him. There exists a threshold, which is denoted by aˆ , i.e., individuals with 
ability lower than aˆ  do not invest, while others with ability higher than aˆ  
invest. Hence, the investment ratio is aˆ1− . In section 2.3, investment has no 
effect on tA , because economic growth is assumed to be exogenous. In 
section 2.5, we assume that investment has a positive external effect on the 
aggregate technology level. As a result, long-run economic growth is 
endogenous.   
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2.2.2 The Political Environment 
 
We assume that the ruler does not produce anything. However, she can tax 
the output of citizens. This is the crucial assumption of this paper. 
According to political economy literature, e.g. Benabou (1996), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994, 2000), non-democracy means that the rich, who are more 
productive, have more political power. We argue that this assumption 
describes an imperfect democracy well, but not dictators. This aspect does 
not apply to dictators such as Mobutu in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and the dictators in Chinese history. They became dictators, not 
because they had higher productivity, but because of their military power in 
most cases. Our assumption is similar to that of McGuire and Olson (1996), 
where dictatorship impedes the growth of productivity due to taxation. The 
political institution is defined by the vector ( )s,τ 7. The tax rate τ  lies 
between [ ] 1,,0 <ττ  and the social transfer s  is financed through taxation. 
1<τ  reflects the sustenance level. If taxed above that level, all citizens 
would revolt, because they have nothing left after taxation. For simplicity 
two extreme cases are considered: dictatorship and democracy. We assume 
that the initial political state is dictatorship, where the ruler can choose the 
tax rate and decide how to distribute the tax revenue. The bad dictator 
consumes the entire tax income alone, i.e., asa ∀= 0 . However, the good 
dictator shares the benefit with some citizens through social transfer, i.e., 
0≥as , for some 0, >asa , which is named the group-specific social 
transfer. The dictatorship is characterized by taxation. Both the good and 
                                                 
7 This assumption comes directly from Lee (2003). To describe the difference between 
dictatorship and democracy he uses two variables, i.e., participation bias and redistribution 
bias. However, he does not consider the commitment problem. Hence, both of them are 
determined simultaneously in his model.  This assumption is also consistent with Persson 
and Tabellini (2000). In their book (chapter 14), the taxation of capital income and the 
public investment in infrastructures are two policy instruments, which naturally affect 
private rates of return on investment, and in turn, economic performance. However, they 
study their effects in different models and do not consider group-specific public investment.  
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bad dictators tax citizens. The dictator is good in the sense that her 
redistribution policy ( 0≥as , for some 0, >asa ) is growth-enhancing.  
 
Dictator knows the distribution of private ability and the investment 
decision of citizens. However, she can not distinguish between individuals 
by ability. Hence, her group-specific social transfer policy can be set on the 
base of investment, but not upon private ability. For instance, Chinese 
government invests a lot in universities and sets an entrance examination. 
Only the candidates who pass the examination can study in these public 
universities. Here, studying in public universities is a human capital 
investment for the citizens as well as a social transfer from the government 
to the citizens who invest. Such social transfer is sunk and irreversible, e.g., 
universities are built before citizens decide to undergo education. It also is 
group-specific, e.g., only individuals with higher ability will undergo 
education. An entrance examination is not the single form of selection 
mechanism. For instance, the free infrastructure in industry zones is a social 
transfer from government to the individual who invests in this area.  
    
In a democracy, there is no ruler and the tax rate is determined by all 
citizens through a “one-person-one-vote” majority voting system, where 
every agent gets the same transfer ass dema ∀= , . We assume that social 
transfer in a democracy is not group-specific, not because in reality there is 
no group-specific social transfer in the democratic society (in general, all 
social transfers are considered to be group-specific), but because the nature 
of democracy is such that everybody is treated equally. Hence, although the 
individual project, which is financed by the democratic government, could 
be group-specific, in the aggregate, the democratic government concerns 
itself with the interests of all citizens, and the social transfer is more equally 
distributed among individuals than under a dictator. Furthermore, allowing 
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group-specific social transfers in democracy would complicate our analysis 
of democracy, whereas the current article focuses on the non-democracy. 
Allowing group-specific social transfer in democracy does not qualitatively 
change our results concerning dictatorial behavior.8 In fact, different 
majorities of citizens could support different group-specific social transfer 
schemes in democracy. Finally, everybody obtains the same a priori.  
 
In order to attempt to change the political state through revolution, a citizen 
pays P  for a weapon, and encounters a cost c  if a revolution occurs. This 
cost of revolution could be either considered as the destroyed income in 
turmoil (Acemoglu 2001), or reflect the cooperation and/or coordination 
problem among a large scale of citizens. The cooperation problem among 
citizens has been modeled in details in some papers, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 
(2004a). The ruler acts by herself. Hence, she has no such problem. If the 
revolution is successful, the ruler dies. As a result, the ruler always tries to 
prevent the revolution. She also buys the weapon in order to repress the 
revolution. For simplicity, we assume the price of weapon to be fixed and 
the same for all. Whether the revolution can succeed depends on who 
possesses more weapons. This political transition is modeled by a sequential 
game. The citizens move first, the ruler then reacts. We assume that the 
ruler moves later, in order to reflect the advantage of holding political 
power. She can adjust the expenditure on weapons according to the 
revolution decision of citizens. However, this order of decisions reflects the 
actual weapon expenditures of citizens and the ruler but does not change the 
timing of the revolution. The current model focuses on the behavior of the 
ruler in dictatorship. Hence, the time of revolution, in turn, the life time of 
                                                 
8 Appendix 2.2 shows that democracy is even better, if we allow that in democracy, social 
transfer is only given to the individual who invests. Then the citizens have higher incentive 
to revolt. Our result that the dictator faces a trade-off when she implements a positive social 
transfer policy has no qualitative change.   
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the dictator is the key issue. The amount spent on weapons by the citizens 
will not affect the social transfer policy of the dictator. 
 
2.2.3 The Timing 
 
Upon birth all citizens realize their abilities, and other exogenous 
parameters ( e,, λτ ) are revealed. It is a finite repeated game between the 
ruler and a continuum of citizens until revolution succeeds. Within every 
period they play a sequential game, whose timing of events can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. At the beginning of period t , the technology level tA  is determined 
either by the exogenous factor (section 2.3), or by the endogenous 
variables in time 1−t  (section 2.5).  
2. Citizens determine whether or not to undertake a revolution. 
3. If there is no revolution, or if the revolution is repressed, the ruler 
can keep her political power. Then she decides whether to be a good 
dictator or not, i.e., to choose the scheme of the social transfer ( as ). 
The ruler can not observe the individuals’ ability, but she can see 
whether the citizen invests or not.  
4. If the revolution is successful, the ruler is killed and citizens 
establish the democratic political system.  
5. After watching the political state and the behavior of the dictator, 
citizens decide whether to invest, i.e., aˆ  is determined.  
6. Citizens produce output. 
7. The tax rate τ  is determined either by the ruler in dictatorship, or by 
the one-person-one-vote majority voting system in democracy. The 
tax revenue is collected and citizens receive the remaining output.  
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We assume that the tax rate is determined after production in order to reflect 
the idea that taxation is the key property of the dictatorship. The dictator has 
to tax the citizens because she holds all political power. Any promise to 
reduce the tax rate is incredible with regard to the citizens. This concept 
constitutes the basis of the democratization theory of Acemoglu (2000). 
However, we assume that the social transfer is paid to citizens before 
production, hence, it is credible. Thus, the prepaid social transfer gives the 
dictator an opportunity to become good.  
 
We assume a perfect capital market with zero interest rate to finance all 
possible expenditures before production. With this crucial assumption the 
democratization process in the current model depends on the expected 
future income. The more the taxed income in dictatorship compared to that 
in democracy is, the greater the incentive to democratize is. Thus, the 
current model is consistent with the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. For 
simplicity, we assume that all debts should be cleared at the end of each 
period. The rest of income is eaten, thus, there is no saving. 
 
All agents are risk neutral. Hence, utility can be measured by net income, 
which is totally consumed by agents within the period. Without taking the 
weapon expenditure into consideration, the net income of citizen a  at the 
end of period t  is:   
 
                                      tatattatat eAIsyY −+−= )1( τ                               ( 2.2 ) 
 
And the ruler’s net income is:       
 
                                       ∫ −= dasyY atatttruler )(, τ                                     ( 2.3 )   
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In the following sections, we solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium and 
analyze behavioral determinants of the dictator. According to backward 
induction, we first discuss the economic decision of agents and solve for the 
income of individuals in each political institution. In section 2.4, we study 
the political decision whether or not to revolt. 
 
2.3 The Exogenous Growth Model 
 
2.3.1 Dictatorship 
 
The initial political institution is dictatorship. We assume that the 
technology level tA  grows exogenously. In section 2.4 we will know that 
the life time of the ruler depends on tA  (see equation 2.20 and 2.23), which 
is the single state variable in this simple model. Since this is a repeated 
game with finite periods and the tax rate is set after production, the dictator 
chooses ττ =dic  regardless of whether she is good or bad. Although the 
good dictator is willing to encourage the citizen to invest, she cannot use the 
tax rate as the policy tool. As long as she holds all political power in her 
hand and taxation takes place after production, citizens are never convinced 
to invest by the promise of tax reduction.  
 
The dictator selects a subset of the citizens and each will receive an amount 
ts  at time t . The ruler will make the social transfer if and only if the citizen 
will invest and thereby increase their taxable output. Clearly the dictator 
will not make a social transfer to non-investing citizens. Now define 
SAs tt = , where S  is the steady state ratio of social transfer to technology 
level. We may treat S , rather than ts , as the ruler’s decision variable. 
Denote the ability level by )(ˆ Sa  for the citizen who is indifferent between 
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investing and not investing when the ruler uses the social transfer ratio S . 
For a citizen with ability a , )(ˆ Saa > , then he will have income 
( ) ttt eASAaNA −+−τλ 1 , after investing. If the citizen has ability a , 
)(ˆ Saa < , he receives no social transfer and does not invest so has income 
( )aNAt τ−1 . For the citizen with ability a , )(ˆ Saa = , these two incomes 
must be equal: ( ) ( ) )(ˆ1)(ˆ1 SaNAeASASaNA tttt ττλ −=−+− . Solving for 
)(ˆ Sa  leads to: 
    
                                       ( )( )τλ −−
−=
11
)(ˆ
N
SeSa                                       ( 2.4 ) 
 
After (2.4) is derived, suppose no transfer takes place ( 0=S ) to anyone. 
We want to assume that citizens with sufficiently high ability (near 1) will 
still invest. In other words, that means 1)0(ˆ <a . Now we can see that 
1)0(ˆ <a  from (2.4) becomes inequality (A.2.1): 
 
                                        τλ −<− 1)1(N
e                                             (A.2.1) 
 
This assumption states that the net benefit of investment for the individual 
with 1=a  ( )1)(1( τλ −−N ) is greater than the cost ( e ), even if he gets no 
transfer from the dictator. I.e., his net return rate of private investment 
e
N )1)(1( τλ −−  is greater than 1. With this assumption we avoid the corner 
solution, i.e., we always have 1)(ˆ <Sa  for all 0≥S . The ruler chooses the 
optimal transfer S  in order to maximize her income: 
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Substitute (2.4) and recall the assumption that the social transfer is non-
negative, we get exgS  from the first-order condition. The second-order 
condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
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Proposition 2.1 
If assumption (A.2.1) holds and tA  grows exogenously, the dictator will be 
bad if  
)1(
)1( 2 −≥− λτ N
e ; she will be good if 
)1(
)1( 2 −<− λτ N
e . The 
dictator is better the higher τ  , the lower the level of natural resources and 
the lower the return rate of private investment. 
 
As we assumed previously, the bad ruler consumes all tax income and sets 
the social transfer at asa ∀= 0 . badaˆ , reflecting this threshold in a bad 
dictatorship, equals to ( )( )τλ −− 11N
e . Rearranging the condition of a good 
dictator 
)1(
)1( 2 −<− λτ N
e  and substituting from badaˆ , we have 
τ<− badaˆ1 . badaˆ1−  is the investment ratio in the bad dictatorship, and τ  
represents the highest tax rate. If private investment is not attractive to 
citizens, i.e., badaˆ1−  is very low, the ruler has the incentive to be good thus 
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encouraging citizens to invest. As expected, if the highest tax rate declines, 
the ruler is less likely to be good. Because badaˆ1−  strictly decreases in τ , 
we have a unique ∗τ , so that ∗∗ =− ττ )(ˆ1 bada . For all ∗≤ ττ , the dictator is 
bad, and for all ∗> ττ  she is good. This result implies that the dictator 
wants to encourage private investment, if τ  is high enough, i.e., she can tax 
enough after production. For the dictator, the social transfer is similar to an 
investment, using the tax rate as her rate of return.   
 
If the condition for being good is satisfied, the good dictator pays a positive 
social transfer goodS  to the citizen who will invest. Substituting positive 
goodS  in (2.4), we obtain:  
 
                                    
)2)(1(
)1)(1(ˆ τλ
τλ
−−
−−+=
N
Neagood                                   ( 2.6 )  
 
The good dictator has two effects for citizens: first, the individual who 
invests can earn more due to the positive social transfer; second, the positive 
social transfer decreases the entry barrier investment, hence, more citizens 
will invest. (It is easy to see that badgood aa ˆˆ < ) Of course the citizen who 
does not invest can not increase his income in the good dictatorship.  
 
Proposition 2.2:  
If condition 
)1(
)1( 2 −<− λτ N
e  holds, the transition from the bad to the 
good dictatorship is a Pareto-improving process. More citizens invest, 
aggregate output increases and all agents obtain a higher or at least the 
same income.  
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The proposition is easy to prove, since goodS  is the optimal choice for the 
ruler given 
)1(
)1( 2 −<− λτ N
e , and citizens receive a positive social transfer 
from the ruler. The Pareto-improving process is achieved, because the 
transition ensures the income of the good dictator to exceed that of the bad 
dictator. The incomes of the ruler and citizens in the bad and good 
dictatorship in period t  are given as follows, respectively: 
 
                        ( )( ) 


−−−= ²11
²
2
1
2 τλλτ N
eNAY t
bad
ruler                              ( 2.7 ) 
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                        
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<−=
goodgood
tt
good
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aaNaA
Y
ˆ)1(
ˆ)1(
τλ
τ
            ( 2.10 )  
 
From (2.7) to (2.10) we can easily see that badruler
good
ruler YY >  and badagooda YY ≥ . 
 
2.3.2 Democracy 
 
In a democratic society, the tax rate is determined by all citizens through a 
“one-person-one-vote” majority voting system. The tax revenue is equally 
distributed to every citizen.9 Hence, the median voter is the deciding person. 
He maximizes his income tY ,5.0 , subject to the budget constraint of 
redistribution: 
                                                 
9 In Appendix 2.2, I will show the case where the tax revenue is only given to the individual 
who invests.  
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                                 t
I
tt eAIsNAYMax 5.0,5.0 )1(5.0 5.0 −+−= τλτ  
                                 ( )²ˆ²ˆ5.0.. 1
0
aaNAdaysts tat λλττ −+== ∫  
 
There are two cases:  
 
1. If 5.0ˆ >a , i.e., the median voter doesn’t invest. Hence, his 
maximization problem reduces to:  
                       
                       ( )²ˆ²ˆ5.0)1(5.0,5.0 aaNANAY tttMax λλτττ −++−=  
 
The first order condition is: 
                              
        0)ˆ1)(1(5.0)ˆ²ˆ(5.05.0 22,5.0 >−−=−++−=∂
∂
aNAaaNANA
Y
ttt
t λλλτ  
 
Hence  ττ =1,dem . In order to solve 1,ˆdema , we have: 
 
        saNAseAaNAinvestnoYinvestY tttatat +−=+−−⇔= )1(ˆ)1(ˆ)()( ττλ       
 
We get:             ( )( )τλ −−= 11ˆ 1, N
eadem                                                 ( 2.11 ) 
 
And:                  ( )( ) 


−−−= ²11
²
2
1
2
1,
τλλτ N
eNAs t
dem                         ( 2.12 ) 
 
Hence,          
( )
( )
 ≥+−−
<+−=
1,1,
1,1,
1,
ˆ1
ˆ1
demdem
tt
demdem
tdem
at aaseAaNA
aasNaA
Y τλ
τ
               ( 2.13 ) 
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If condition ( )( ) 2
1
11
ˆ 1, >−−= τλN
eadem  holds, democracy decreases 
inequality (comparing (2.13) and (2.10)). However, the aggregate output is 
the same as that of the bad dictatorship. 
 
2. If  5.0ˆ ≤a , the median voter invests. His maximization problem then 
becomes: 
 
                 ( ) tttt eAaaNANAYMax −−++−= ²ˆ²ˆ5.0)1(5.0,5.0 λλττλτ  
 
The first order condition is: 
 
                 0²ˆ)1(5.0)ˆ²ˆ(5.05.0 25.0 <−=−++−=∂
∂ aNAaaNANAY ttt λλλλτ    
 
Hence, 02, =demτ  and 02, =dems .  
 
We get:              
)1(
ˆ 2, −= λN
eadem                                                         ( 2.14 )                                       
                          
 ≥−
<=
2,
2,
2,
ˆ
ˆ
dem
tt
dem
tdem
at aaeAaNA
aaNaA
Y λ                              ( 2.15 ) 
 
The aggregate output is as follows: ( )


−+−= 12
²
2
2,
λ
λ
N
eeNAY t
dem
t  ( 2.16 ) 
 
If condition ( ) 2
1
1
ˆ 2, ≤−= λN
eadem  holds, democracy is capable of increasing 
aggregate output. This is because the tax rate is set at the lowest level. 
Individuals are encouraged to invest. 
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The tax rate and the investment ratio in the democratic society depend on 
the behavior of the median voter. If he finds that it is not worth investing 
(this is the case 
2
1
)1(
>−λN
e ), then he supports a higher tax rate (here, 
ττ =1,dem ). Therefore, the democratic society suffers also from a lower 
investment ratio, which is as same as in the bad dictatorship. If 
2
1
)1(
τ
λ
−≤−N
e , i.e., the investment is attractive enough to the median 
voter, then he would support a lower tax rate (here, 0=τ ). Consequently, 
the economy enjoys a higher output level due to a higher investment ratio. If 
2
1
)1(2
1 ≤−<
−
λ
τ
N
e , the median voter has two choices. Whether the 
investment is worthwhile to implement depends on his choice of the tax 
rate. If he decides to support a higher tax rate after production, he also 
knows that the investment is worthless to undertake. Hence, he chooses not 
to invest before production. All other citizens observe his investment choice 
and expect that he will support a higher tax rate after production. Hence, the 
investment ratio is at the lower level. Vice versa, if he would like to invest, 
then he must choose a lower tax rate after investment. Thus, two possible 
investment ratios and redistribution schemes could be achieved: 
),,ˆ( 1,1, demdem sa τ , )0,0,ˆ( 2,dema . Which one is actually chosen by the median 
voter depends on the parameter constellation. 
 
Proposition 2.3:  
1. If 
2
1
)1(
τ
λ
−≤−N
e , democracy can increase aggregate output, and if 
2
1
)1(
>−λN
e  democracy can only decrease inequality, but cannot 
increase  aggregate output.  
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2. In the moderate case of 
2
1
)1(2
1 ≤−<
−
λ
τ
N
e , the impact of 
democracy is ambiguous where two possibilities exist: 
),,ˆ( 1,1, demdem sa τ  and )0,0,ˆ( 2,dema . The median voter is willing to 
choose )0,0,ˆ( 2,dema , if 
2
1≥τ . 
 
Proof: The first part is already clear.  The second part is easy to see, if we 
compare the incomes of the median voter in two cases. He will choose 
)0,0,ˆ( 2,dema , if it generates higher income for him. I.e., 
⇔≥− 01,5.02,5.0 demdem YY 2)ˆ1(
1ˆ2
21,
1,
−+
−≥ dem
dem
a
aτ . Unfortunately, 
2)ˆ1(
1ˆ2
21,
1,
−+
−
dem
dem
a
a  
depends on τ . Hence, the economic meaning of this condition is not very 
intuitive. However, notice that 
2
1
2)ˆ1(
1ˆ2
21,
1,
<−+
−
dem
dem
a
a . Thus, the sufficient 
condition is 
2
1≥τ , i.e., the median voter will choose )0,0,ˆ( 2,dema  if the 
highest tax rate is high enough.                                                             Q.E.D. 
 
The existence of multiple effects is consistent with the literature of political 
economy, which emphasizes the different effects of democracy on the 
economic performance. By assuming that the majority in a democracy is 
poor, this literature often argues that democracy hinders economic 
investment due to a higher level of redistribution. On the other hand, 
democracy also protects against taxation through the strong rule of law, 
which is good for economic performance. In the current model we argue 
that both could occur under different circumstances. The case of )0,0,ˆ( 2,dema  
indicates the positive impact of democracy on economic performance, 
because democracy protects private investments from expropriative 
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taxation. On the other hand, the case of ),,ˆ( 1,1, demdem sa τ  reflects the negative 
impact of democracy on economic growth owing to the high tax rate. 
However, this negative effect has a different economic meaning compared 
to that of the bad dictatorship )0,,ˆ( τbada . Whereas the former is pure 
redistribution, the latter is pure expropriation. Proposition 3 shows that 
which case occurs in the moderate case depends on parameters, in 
particular, the highest tax rate, τ . It reflects to what extent the political 
power is able to influence economic performance. If it is large enough 
(
2
1≥τ ), individuals try to avoid redistribution and choose the lower tax 
rate. Hence, democracy has an aggregate effect on economic performance. 
For our purpose, it is more interesting to restrict attention to this case, i.e. 
)0,0,ˆ( 2,dema . Hence, we assume 
2
1
)1(
≤−λN
e  and 
2
1≥τ  for simplicity. 
Combining the above (A.2.1), we need to make the following assumption: 
 
                                        
2
11
)1(
≤−≤− τλN
e                                       (A.2.2) 
 
We focus on the case where democracy has an aggregate effect on economic 
performance, because only in this case democratization is possible. The pure 
redistributive democracy ),,ˆ( 1,1, demdem sa τ  means that the expenditure of the 
ruler on weapons is more than that of the citizen net of the democratization 
cost. (For more details, see section 2.4) Hence, such “democratization” is 
impossible. 
 
Combining the condition 
)1(
)1( 2 −<− λτ N
e  and Assumption (A.2.2), we 
have: 
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The “goodness” ASSUMPTION:     
2
11
)1(
)1( 2 ≤−≤−<− τλτ N
e     (A.2.3) 
 
This assumption is the sufficient condition of a good democracy in the sense 
that it has the aggregate effect on economic performance, and it also 
constitutes the condition of a good dictatorship. That is why we call it the 
“goodness” assumption. Since gooddem aa ˆˆ 2, < , the good democracy leads to a 
better economic performance than the good dictatorship. However, 
democratization is a social conflict, while the transition from the bad 
dictatorship to the good one is Pareto-improving.  
 
2.4 Democratization 
 
In the present paper the process of democratization is modeled as a two 
stage sequential game with perfect information. First the citizen decides 
whether to revolt, then the ruler decides whether to repress. Both revolution 
and repression require weapons. The citizen attempts to undertake a 
revolution, if he expects a higher level of income could be earned in a 
democratic society. Hence, if necessary, the citizen will offer the difference 
of his income in two political states as the highest payment for the weapon. 
Similarly, the dictator is willing to use her whole income to prevent the 
possible political transition, because she will lose all in the democratic 
society. Although both are willing to offer the whole life-time income, they 
cannot do so because we assume that the perfect financial market acts well 
only within one period. This assumption simplifies the analysis without loss 
of generality. Moreover, there is a revolution cost c  for citizens. Hence, 
citizens don’t invest in weapons if they expect their ruler to invest more than 
their highest payments in weapons net of the revolutionary cost. If they find 
that the ruler’s income is lower than their highest payment for weapons net 
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of the revolution cost, their best choice is to invest in weapons a little more 
than the ruler’s income. Thus we only need to compare the highest 
payments of both players for weapons, which are named the incentive of 
political transition. Revolution is the best choice for the citizen if and only if 
the citizens’ incentive to revolt net of the revolutionary cost is higher than 
the incentive of the ruler to repress. For simplicity, we assume that the 
citizen will choose revolution when both are equal.  
 
We will consider two possible democratization processes: from the bad 
dictatorship directly to democracy, and from the bad dictatorship indirectly 
to democracy via the good dictatorship.  
 
2.4.1 The Incentive of Political Transition in the Bad 
Dictatorship 
 
The highest payment of citizen a  in period t  is the difference between 
incomes in the bad dictatorship and the democratic society within t : 
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        ( 2.17 ) 
 
The first part ( τλaNAt ) is the taxed income of the citizen who invests in 
both political states. The second difference of incomes 
( τλ NaAeAaNA ttt +−− )1( ) comes from the citizen who invests in 
democracy but not in the bad dictatorship. The benefit of democracy for this 
group of citizens comes from two sides: the release of the expropriating 
taxation ( τNaAt ), and the investment return ( tt eAaNA −− )1(λ ). Finally, 
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the citizen, who invests neither in democracy nor the bad dictatorship, saves 
the tax in democracy ( τNaAt ). The sum of individual offers net of the 
revolutionary cost is the citizens’ highest net expenditure on weapons. 
 
                 cdaPP badat
bad
tcitizen −= ∫10, cN
eANA tt −−−−= )1)(1(2
²
2 τλ
ττλ         ( 2.18 ) 
 
For the ruler:        bad truler
bad
truler YP ,, = ( )( ) 


−−−= ²11
²
2
1
2 τλλτ N
eNAt         ( 2.19 ) 
 
The difference of payments between the citizen and the dictator determines 
whether the revolution will succeed:  
 
                          ( )( ) cN
eAPP tbad truler
bad
tcitizen
bad
t −−−=−=∆ ²112
²²
,, τλ
τ                ( 2.20 ) 
 
If 0≥∆badt , the aggregate highest payment of citizens exceeds that of the 
ruler. Hence, citizens choose revolution and expend a little more on 
weapons than the highest payment of the ruler. The ruler knows the 
repression will not be successful, thus, the actual repression does not occur. 
If 0<∆badt , citizens know that the revolution will be repressed, hence, they 
don’t choose to revolt. We assume the society begins from the non-
democracy. Hence, at the beginning period ( 1=t ), bad1∆  is negative. We 
have the following assumption: 
 
The “status quo” ASSUMPTION:              ( )( ) cN
eA <−− ²112
²²1
τλ
τ        ( A.2.4 ) 
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Equation (2.20) has the following important indications. First, the higher τ , 
the greater the incentive for citizens to seek democratization. Second, as 
most of the political economy literature argues, e.g. the Lipset/Aristotle 
hypothesis, democracy follows the good economic performance. Here, the 
economic growth rate is given by the exogenous growth rate of the 
aggregate technology level tA . With tA  growing, the benefit from 
revolution increases. Third, the effects of the investment project on the 
incentive of democratization is demonstrated by the parameters N  and e,λ . 
The more beneficial the project (i.e. the lower e  and/or the higher λ  and 
N ), the lower the incentive to democratize. The first part of equation (2.20) 
is from the investment return of the “middle class”, who invests in 
democracy but not in dictatorship, i.e., ∫ −−baddemaat daeaNA ˆˆ ))1(( λ . The citizen 
of “middle class” has a higher incentive to revolt, if λ  and N  increases 
and/or e  declines. However, the size ( dembad aa ˆˆ − ) of this group decreases in 
N  and λ . The more beneficial the investment project, the smaller the 
aggregate effect of democracy. Hence, the net social incentive ( badt∆ ) 
decreases. This relationship between economic performance and political 
transition is possibly supported by the fact that oil impedes democratization 
(e.g., Ross 2001). In this framework, we can argue that a country’s oil 
wealth increases the average return rate of the private investment 
(
e
N
2
)1( −λ ). Hence, the size of middle class shrinks. Such societies have a 
lower incentive to democratize.  
 
Proposition 2.4:  
In the bad dictatorship, the incentive of democratization increases in the 
technology level tA , and decreases in the natural resource N . The higher 
the taxation level τ , the greater is the incentive of revolution. The net social 
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incentive of democratization decreases in the return of the investment 
project and increases in its cost e . 
 
Comparing this result to Proposition 2.1, we find that the impact of τ , N  
and the return rate of the private investment on democratization is similar to 
that on the behavior of the bad dictator. If the highest tax rate increases, the 
bad dictator faces an increasing risk of revolution according to Proposition 
2.4, and intuitively, she also has a larger incentive to become good 
according to Proposition 2.1.  
                       
2.4.2 The Incentive of Political Transition in the Good 
Dictatorship 
 
For the good dictator the positive social transfer increases tax revenues. 
Hence, she also has more incentives to prevent the revolution than the bad 
dictator: 
 
                           
)2)(1(2
))1((
2
2
, τλ
λτ
−−
−−+=
N
eNANAP ttgoodtruler                              ( 2.21 ) 
 
The democratization incentive of citizens is as follows: 
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The poor who don’t invest in both political states suffer the expropriative 
taxation in the dictatorship. Hence, he prefers to undertake revolution. Here, 
we model this as a positive payment τNaAt  for weapons. For the middle 
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class )ˆ,ˆ( gooddem aaa∈  who invest in democracy but not in the good 
dictatorship, their payment for weapons is positive, i.e., 
=goodatP ])1([ eaNAt −+− τλ 0]ˆ)1([ >−+−> eaNA demt τλ . They support 
democratization, because they can earn more in democratic society.   
 
However, a priori, it is unclear whether the rich, who invest both in the 
good dictatorship and democracy, support democracy or not. If their 
payment for political transition goodt saNA −τλ  is negative, they can earn 
more in the good dictatorship and become the supporter of this political 
institution.  
 
Proposition 2.5:  
The citizen with the highest ability 1 always supports democracy, whereas 
some of the rich, who invest both in the good dictatorship and democracy, 
could support the dictatorship under certain conditions. 
 
Proof: see Appendix 2.1. 
 
This Proposition indicates that the dictator can extend the social support of 
the regime by means of a positive social transfer. Surprisingly, the group 
which possibly supports the regime is not the one with the highest ability, 
but a group with a relatively lower ability, although their ability great 
enough to let them invest in both dictatorship and democracy. In this sense, 
the “top rich” do not sympathize with the good dictator. 
 
Again, cdaPP goodat
good
tcitizen −= ∫10,  and the net social incentive of 
democratization of the whole society is: 
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Proposition 2.6:  
1) In the good dictatorship, the incentive of democratization increases in the 
aggregate technology level. The higher the taxation level, the less the 
incentive of revolution is. The net social incentive of democratization 
increases in natural resources and the return of the investment project and 
decreases in its cost. 
2) Because of Pareto-improving social transfer the incentive of 
democratization in the good dictatorship is lower than in the bad one. 
 
Proof:  1) It is clear that 0>∂
∆∂
t
good
t
A
, 0<∂
∆∂
τ
good
t , 0>∂
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N
good
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∆∂
e
good
t . 
             2) ∫ −−−=−=∆ 10 ,,, )( bad trulerbadatdematbad trulerbad tcitizenbadt YcdaYYPP      
                 ∫ −−−=−=∆ 10 ,,, )( goodtrulergoodatdematgoodtrulergood tcitizengoodt YcdaYYPP        
                 [ ] 0)( 1
0 ,,
1
0
>−+−=∆−∆ ∫ ∫ bad trulergoodtrulerbadatgoodatgoodtbadt YYdaYdaY     Q.E.D. 
 
Comparing to Proposition 2.4, it is of interest to see that the effects of 
investment and the tax rate on the incentive to revolt differ between the bad 
and good dictatorship. Analogously, the first term of (2.23) is also from the 
investment return of the “middle class”, i.e., ∫ −−gooddemaat daeaNA ˆˆ ))1(( λ . The 
size ( demgood aa ˆˆ − ) of this group increases, if N  and λ  increases and/or e  
declines. Hence, the net social incentive ( goodt∆ ) increases. In other words, 
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this model predicts that natural resources accelerate democratization in the 
good dictatorship. This, however, requires future empirical evidence. In the 
good dictatorship, taxation is the mixture of redistribution and 
expropriation. The increase of the highest tax rate implies that social support 
of the dictatorship could widen. Hence, the incentive for democratization 
declines.  
 
Proposition 2.6 strengthens Proposition 2.1. An increase in the highest tax 
rate gives rise to a higher incentive for the dictator to be good, because she 
can tax more. Furthermore, the good dictator faces a smaller danger of 
revolution if the highest tax rate increases. Analogously, if the private 
investment is more profitable, the dictator has less incentive to be good, and 
the good dictator faces a larger possibility of revolution.    
  
Improvement of the citizen’s income due to the positive social transfer 
decreases their incentive to change the political state, whereas the good 
dictator resists the democratization more than the bad one because of the 
higher economic benefit. Hence, given the technology level, we argue that 
the opportunity of democratization decreases in the economic performance 
during the transition from the bad dictatorship to the good. However, it does 
not directly contradict the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. As we have seen, if 
the economy grows with the technology level, the society has a higher 
incentive to become a democracy. In the following section, we consider the 
external effect of the individual’s investment on the aggregate technology 
level and demonstrate that the technology progress enlarges the income 
difference between dictatorship and democracy.  
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2.5 External Effect and Endogenous Growth 
 
So far we have assumed that the aggregate technology level, as well as the 
long-run economic growth, is given exogenously. The dictator is good if she 
finds that the positive social transfer can increase her instantaneous income. 
In other words, we have assumed that the behavior of the dictator can affect 
short run economic performance, but not long-run economic growth. Now 
we introduce endogenous technological progress to our simple model. As is 
standard in endogenous growth theory,10 the aggregate technology level and, 
in turn, the economic growth rate, increases in the investment ratio aˆ1− . 
We assume for simplicity that private investment has a positive externality 
on the aggregate technology level, i.e., ))ˆ(1( 11 −− += ttt aGAA , where )ˆ( 1−taG  
is the growth rate of the aggregate technology level, 0)ˆ(' 1 <−taG . Because 
of (2.4), we know ( )( )τλ −−
−=
11
ˆ
N
Sea tt . Hence, the growth rate of tA  is the 
increasing function of the social transfer in period 1−t , denoted by 
)())(ˆ( 111 −−− ≡ ttt SgSaG , where 0)( 1 >′ −tSg . This is the single linkage across 
periods. According to the assumption that financial markets are perfect only 
within a period, no income can be transferred across periods. From 
equations (2.20) and (2.23) we know that the higher growth rate of 
technology level leads to a sooner political transition. Hence, there could be 
a tradeoff for the ruler between a greater benefit in the short run and 
relatively faster democratization in the long-run. From now on, we 
standardize 1=N  for simplicity.  
 
                                                 
10 There are two main approaches to model the role of human capital in economic growth: 
Lucas (1988) emphasizes the externality of human capital in production; Nelson and Phelps 
(1966), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
argue that the human capital will induce more innovation or let the economy accept new 
technology.  
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As the growth rate is endogenous, all individuals know the life-time of the 
dictator, which is the first period with a non-negative t∆ . The dictator sets 
the tax rate on τ . As we know from (2.20) and (2.23),          
                             
                                ∫ −−−=∆ dicdemaatt cdaeaA ˆˆ ))1((λ                              ( 2.24 ) 
 
In order to make the analysis tractable, we consider a three-period model in 
this section. We assume that the revolution takes place in the third period. 
According to (2.24), it implies 03 >∆  for any 1S  and 2S . Hence, the 
sufficient and necessary condition for 03 >∆  is: 
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where ( )( )τλ −−
−=
11
ˆ
exg
dic Sea  and exgS  is the optimal social transfer in the 
exogenous growth model, as shown in (2.5). This condition means that 
revolution will take place in the third period, even if the ruler sets the social 
transfer at the lowest level (i.e., 0=S ) in the first two periods. Hence, the 
dictator knows that the second period is her last period. Then she acts the 
same as in the exogenous growth model, i.e., she maximizes her 
instantaneous income. Thus, exgSS =2 . What we want to show here is the 
social transfer in the first period 1S . This is the social transfer in the 
endogenous growth model. In period 1, the dictator is aware of two effects 
of her social transfer policy. First, her transfer can encourage more citizens 
to invest, and in turn, increase her income in period 1. Secondly, more 
investment implies the higher technology level in the second period, and in 
turn, will render the revolution more likely in period 2. If the revolution 
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takes place in the second period, then the first period is the last period for 
the dictator. Hence, the life-time income of the ruler is given as follows: 
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where 10 ≤≤ ρ  is the discount factor. We define a threshold value rS1  so 
that 0)( 12 =∆ rS , i.e.,  
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Hence, for all rSS 11 > , revolution occur in the second period. The ruler 
knows that. Hence, she chooses exgS  in the first period. For all rSS 11 ≤ , the 
dictator can live for two periods. Hence, she chooses 
)),(()(maxargmaxarg 122,11,11
exg
rulerruler SSAYSYVS ρ+==∗ , subject to 
rSS 11 ≤ . We define 1Sˆ  as the unconstrained optimal social transfer, so that 
0)(~
~
1111
ˆ1ˆ1
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==
exg
ruler
SSSS
ruler SY
dS
dg
dS
Yd ρ .  Sum up, { }111 ˆ,min SSS r=∗ . Because 
exgS  is the optimal social transfer in the exogenous growth model, we have 
0
~
1
1
=
= exgSS
ruler
dS
Yd . Hence, exgSS >1ˆ . We define 1~S  so that 
)(~))~(1()~(~ 11
exgSYSgSY ρρ −−= . Hence, if 11 ~SS r < , then the dictator sets 
exgSS =1  and lives for one period. This social transfer decision of the 
dictator in the endogenous growth model is shown in Figure 2.1 and 
summarized in Proposition 2.7.  
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Figure 2.1 Social transfer in relation to the life-time income  
of the dictator 
 
Proposition 2.7 
In the endogenous growth model, the dictator chooses the social transfer as 
follows: 
1. In the last period of her life-time, the dictator acts the same as in the 
exogenous growth model. 
2. In the period before, the dictator sets { }SSS r ˆ,min=∗ . rS  increases 
in the revolution cost c  and decreases in the initial technology level 
1A . { }SSS r ˆ,min=∗  could be smaller than exgS .  
 
The effect of  
1A
c  on the social transfer 1S  is non-linear (Figure 2.2). 
Assuming a sufficiently small value of 
1A
c , i.e., 
∫ −−+< dicdemaa daeagA
c ˆ
ˆ
1
))1(())0(1( λ , the first period is the last period for the 
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dictator, thus, exgSS =1 . When 
1A
c  exceeds this threshold value, the dictator 
could live for two periods. However, she isn’t willing to live such a long 
time as long as 11
~SS r < , because living for two periods implies that she has 
to set the social transfer so low that her life-time income of two periods is 
even smaller than that of one period. In this case, the dictator would like to 
transfer more to citizens, although it leads to a sooner revolution. When 
1A
c  
increases further so that 11
~SS r ≥ , the ruler can and is willing to live for two 
periods. Then she chooses { }SSS r ˆ,min=∗ . However, it does not mean 
directly that her social transfer is greater than exgS . Whether ∗S  is greater 
than exgS  depends on 
1A
c . If  
1A
c  is not so big, rS  could be smaller than 
exgS .   
 
                         ∗1S  
                        
                          1ˆS  
 
                       exgS  
                      
 
 
 
                                            1
~S           exgS                                             )(
1
1 A
cS r               
   Figure 2.2: Effect of 
1
1 , A
cS r  on optimal social transfers 
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According to McGuire and Olson (1996), the longer the ruler’s life-time, the 
higher is her incentive to be good. Here, we show that it is also possible for 
the ruler to be worse, when her life-time increases. The reason is that she 
wants to keep her longer life-time, and is concerned more with the negative 
effect of her social transfer policy in the long-run. This relationship is 
shown in the Figure 2.2. 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In the current paper we discussed the determinants of the dictator’s 
incentive to be good in the sense that she would like to share the tax income 
with certain citizens. We emphasized two important effects of private 
investment in production: the individual effect which improves private 
output, and the positive externality on the aggregate technological level. We 
find that the dictator is more likely to be good if the individual faces a less 
profitable investment project. The dictator’s incentive to be good is to tax 
more through encouraging citizens to invest more. Possible evidence is the 
gradual process of Chinese reform, in which regions and sectors reform one 
after another. For the local government, the investment from the central 
government in its region could be seen as a “natural resource”, because the 
local government can use it free of charge. The less it is, the lower is the 
return rate of private investment, in turn, the lower the investment ratio. 
Hence, the local government, who is far away from the economic center in 
the old system, has a higher incentive to encourage private investment. 
Chinese reform began from the agricultural sector, where the central 
government invested nothing in the command economy. Moreover, the 
agriculture reform began from the poor province, Anhui. The nowadays fast 
growing provinces, e.g., Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, are all less 
developed areas in the old system. Northeast China, where is the economic 
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center of the old system and attracted the most investment from the central 
government, is in recession now. Our finding does not directly contradict 
the study of Laffont and Qian (1999), where they argued that the necessary 
condition of reform in one sector is that the private return of investment in 
this sector is large enough to compensate the rent of government in the old 
system. We argue that the ruler would prefer to choose the sector with a 
lower private rate of return, if there are several sectors satisfying the 
necessary condition.    
 
After endogenizing the growth rate, we find two different effects of 
economic performance on democratization. The good dictatorship is capable 
of reducing the incentive of a revolution through increasing the citizens’ 
investment ratio and their income, but it is also possible to lead to an earlier 
democratization given higher economic growth rates. The effect of the 
revolutionary costs on the behavior of the ruler is non-linear. As a 
consequence long life-time does not always lead to a good dictator.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Education, Income Distribution and 
Innovation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between a country’s income distribution and its economic 
growth is a permanent topic which sparks debates not only among 
economists but also policy-makers. In the last fifteen years, most cross-
country studies (e.g., Berg and Sachs 1987, Persson and Tabellini 1994, 
Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Clarke 1995) show that if there is a relationship at 
all, inequality has a negative impact on long-run growth rates. Nonetheless, 
there also is evidence that inequality has a positive impact on short or 
medium run growth rates (Forbes 2000), or that the relationship between the 
income distribution and the long-run growth rate is non-linear (Chen 2003, 
Banerjee and Duflo 2003). In this article we provide a theoretical model to 
shed light on the ambiguous relationship between income distribution and 
the economic growth.11 We argue that inequality, which is measured by the 
                                                 
11 There are many different theoretical models to explain these different empirical results. 
E.g., Bénabou (1996) summarized three points of view to explain the negative impact of 
inequality on growth. Bénabou (2002) provides a model to illustrate the non-linear 
relationship between redistribution and growth.   
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Gini-coefficient, includes many variables, which may have a different 
impact on the economic growth.  
 
For simplicity, we assume that there are two types of consumers, poor 
people and rich people. The income distribution can be measured by two 
variables, the income of the poor relative to the average income, and the 
population share of the poor. Both an increase in the relative income of the 
poor and a decline in the population share of the poor indicate a decrease in 
inequality. The minimal wage level, social insurance and so on could be 
considered as policies to improve the income of the poor, whereas 
mandatory education is easily understood as one to reduce the population 
share of the poor. If they have a different impact on growth, above cross-
country evidence, which is based on the simple regression of the Gini-
coefficient on the economic growth rate, could be ambiguous. In particular, 
we may be unable to draw from such simple empirical studies 
recommendations on redistribution policies for achieving a higher economic 
growth rate as well as a more equal income distribution.  
 
We discuss the impact of the income distribution on the firms’ profits in a 
vertically differentiated goods market in a model originally introduced by 
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). However, our analysis focuses on the 
general equilibrium, whereas those papers are interested in issues of 
competition in a partial equilibrium framework. Rich consumers can afford 
more high quality goods than the poor and are willing to pay more for them. 
Hence, firms supply different qualities to different consumers in order to 
reduce the competitive pressure on prices. Therefore, the firms’ profit 
depends on the income distribution.  
 
Second, economic growth is achieved through innovation. The high quality 
good is firstly invented, and then produced by oligopolists. Innovation is 
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assumed to follow a Poisson process. An inventor can increase the Poisson 
arrival rate through employing more workers. The inventor’s incentive to 
innovate depends on the profit of production after taking the cost of 
innovating into account. Hence, the income distribution can affect 
innovation through profits. If we consider the pooling case, where the 
oligopolistic market reduces to a monopolistic one, we are back to the case 
of Aghion and Howitt (1992).  
 
Inequality may give rise to quality differentiation and a higher incentive for 
firms to innovate because rich consumers can pay more for high quality 
goods than the poor. But on the other side, the relatively small market share 
of high quality goods implied by inequality impedes the spread of better 
quality goods. Hence, the effect of the income distribution on innovation is 
a priori unclear. We consider an overlapping-generations economy, where 
individuals live for two periods: young and old. They decide whether to 
undergo education when young, and how to consume when old. We assume 
that individuals can become rich through education. If we increase the 
relative income of the poor, individuals have less of an incentive to undergo 
education. Hence, the population share of the poor increases. It reflects the 
idea of “social mobility” in political economy, which describes the 
movement of individuals among different income classes.  
 
Assuming interdependence between relative income and population share 
seems realistic. The improvement of relative income of the rich may 
increase the incentive of the poor to become the rich. Of course, we can also 
argue that this incentive will decrease if the poor find that the rich are so 
rich that they can’t catch up. If there are suitable channels in our society 
through which the poor are able to become the rich, for example, through 
education, immigration, or winning a lottery, we may find that the 
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population share of the poor is an endogenous variable given exogenous 
relative income of the poor.  
 
This paper shows that interdependence between relative income and 
population share is crucial in the study of the impact of inequality on 
innovation. The main results of this paper are that there is a separating 
equilibrium, in which the high quality good is sold only to the rich and the 
low quality good only to the poor. In this equilibrium, a lower relative 
income of the poor is good for innovation, and a larger population share of 
the poor is bad for innovation. This result is consistent with Foellmi and 
Zweimüller (2002). But there they introduce hierarchic preferences12, and 
the innovation induces new goods but not the improvement of quality.  The 
result of Zweimüller and Brunner (2005), that the redistribution from the 
rich to the poor raises the innovation rate, does not hold under the 
assumption of interdependence. 
 
Since we focus on the impact of the income distribution on the demand for 
quality goods, the labour market and production are assumed as simple as 
possible: the labour force is the single production factor, which is allocated 
among the production sectors and the research activity. Everybody 
inelastically supplies one unit of labour. This assumption generates another 
novel result that education enrollment is always positively associated with 
the innovation rate, although we have not assumed that education can 
increase productivity. Some might doubt why the educated individual can 
earn more than the non-educated, although they supply the same labour unit. 
In literature (e.g., Glomm et al. 1992, Croix et al. 2003), economists focus 
on the impact of education on economic growth through increasing 
productivity and/or human capital. However, there also are arguments that 
                                                 
12 “A hierarchy of wants implies that goods can be ranked according to their priority in 
consumption” (Foellmi and Zweimüller 2002) 
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education does not necessarily produce human capital, e.g., the signalling 
education. Bils et al. (2000) show the empirical evidence that the positive 
relationship between education enrolment rate and the following economic 
growth rate can not be explained by the human capital theory. The current 
paper concentrates on the demand side effect of income distribution. I.e., we 
investigate the effect of income distribution on the consumption 
expenditure. Hence, it is not necessary to consider the effect of initial 
income distribution on the supply of production factor in this paper. In other 
words, we shed light on how rich consumers spend their income, but neglect 
why they are rich. We argue that education generates not only higher 
productivity, but also richer consumers. The signaling education is able to 
influence economic growth through the demand for better quality. This is 
almost neglected by most economic studies.  
   
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, the set-up of the model is 
introduced. In section 3.3 and 3.4, we study equilibrium and simulate the 
model to show the impact of the relative income of the poor on innovation 
given the endogenous population share of the poor. In section 3.5, we 
discuss the case, where the relative income of the poor is endogenous and 
the population share of the poor is exogenous. Section 3.6 presents the 
dynamics of the model. The main results are summarized in section 3.7. 
  
3.2 The Model 
 
We have two types of agents, consumers and firms. Consumers live for two 
periods: young and old. The young people decide whether to undergo 
education, and the old people decide how to consume. Firms produce two 
kinds of goods, the standard good and the quality good. In order to produce 
quality goods, they must first invent them.  
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3.2.1 The Environment 
 
We consider an overlapping-generations economy populated by a 
continuum of consumers, who live for two periods: young and old. The 
population size is constant. We normalize the population size of young 
people to measure one. Then the population of the old also has measure one 
at any time. In the first period, young individuals receive an amount of 
money from old individuals which can cover their education cost denoted by 
e . This transfer is exogenous. This assumption implies that everybody is 
equal at birth. The difference in the old period is due to the education 
decision in the young period. This transfer e  is the single source of income 
for the young. 
 
The old individual works and owns firms. Our model focuses on the demand 
for consumption in the period “old”. Hence, we assume a simplistic view 
regarding the production of consumption goods. Labour is the single 
productive factor, and every old individual inelastically supplies one unit of 
labour to the competitive labour market. The income of the old individual i  
consists of two parts: w  is the basic income, and iAθ  is the bonus, with θ  as 
the constant dividend rate and iA  taking the value of firms owned by the 
individual i , we call it wealth. Hence, the total income of the old individual 
i  is ii Awy θ+= . For simplicity, we assume that there are only two groups 
of old individuals, the poor (p) and the rich (r), distinguished by wealth, 
pr AA > , and, consequently, by income pr yy > . Their consumption 
expenditure is the total income net of the education cost e . (In Table 3.1 
below, eyp −  and eyr − , respectively.) We assume dVAp = , where d  
( 10 << d ) measures the wealth of the old poor relative to the average level 
of old people, V  is the average wealth per capita in period “old”. Hence, 
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rp AAV )1( ββ −+= , where β  ( 10 << β ) denotes the population share of 
the poor in period “old”. We get VdAr β
β
−
−=
1
1 . Hence, the more young 
people undergo education, the lower the relative wealth of the old rich 
people ( β
β
−
−
1
1 d ), holding d  constant. The average wealth V  is accumulated 
by the profit of firms after netting research costs and interest payment. For 
the definition of profits see section 3.2.3 and for that of research costs see 
section 3.2.4.   
 
Young individuals can decide whether or not to go to school. If they go, 
they pay e  as tuition. Thus, they have nothing left to spend on consumption 
(in Table 1 below, the consumption expenditure of a student is 0). 
Otherwise they can consume with their budget e  (in Table 3.1 below, there 
is consumption expenditure e  for non-students). Without education, a 
young person is confined to a poor position in society upon reaching old age 
and gets wealth pA , otherwise they can have the wealth of a rich person rA . 
In other words, the population share of students in period “young” is β−1 .  
 
Table 3.1: Expenditure and population size of different individuals 
 Young Old 
 Student Non-student Poor Rich 
Consumption 
expenditure 0 e  
eyp −  eyr −  
Population 
size 
β−1  β  β  β−1  
 
This assumption implies that the educated individual can supply a higher 
qualified labour unit than the non-educated. Hence, the rich can earn more 
than the poor, although both work for the same time. The skill premium is 
presented by the difference of the bonus )( pr AA −θ . In reality, we often 
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find that the manager (highly educated individual, or the rich) have more 
shares of firms than workers (lowly educated one, or the poor). Here, we do 
not need to justify exactly why educated labors can acquires more wealth. 
Our purpose is to show the impact of income distribution on the demand for 
the consumption good.  
 
There are two kinds of goods, referred to as standard good and quality good, 
respectively. Let x  be the quantity of the standard good, which has a 
constant quality (normalized to 1) and is traded in a competitive market. 
Hence, the price xP  is equal to its marginal cost, which is also normalized to 
1. The marginal cost of the standard good can be expressed as wb , where 
w  is the basic income of the worker and the unit labour demand is b , which 
measures how many units of labour are needed to produce one unit of the 
standard good. We get 1== wbPx . 
 
The quality goods are traded in an oligopolistic market. At any time there 
are many qualities jq , ,...2,1,0 −−=j  available in the market, the high 
quality good is k  times better than the next lower one: 1−= jj kqq . But 
marginal costs are same, denoted by wa , where 1<a  is again the unit 
labour demand. Every quality good is first invented through research and 
then produced by one firm. After a successful innovation, the new inventor 
can produce a k -times better quality good than the existing best one in the 
next period. Innovation is a random process, which will be introduced in 
section 3.2.4. Hence, the life-time of the oligopolistic firm is uncertain. The 
firm which sells the highest quality good 0q  can keep its position until the 
successful inventor enters, after which its good becomes the second best 
good 1−q  until the next new inventor enters and so on. Since in the original 
model of Zweimüller and Brunner (2005) only two firms can exist in their 
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vertical differentiation competition, we take their results to mean that the 
third best quality is driven out of the market. This third best quality supplier 
can be considered as the potential competitor, who sets the price at the 
marginal cost. Nonetheless its demand is still zero.  
 
3.2.2 The Household’s Decision Problem 
 
Every individual faces a two-stage decision problem. At the beginning of 
young period she decides whether or not to go to school, i.e., she allocates 
the consumption expenditure over time. When she is old, the individual 
decides how to allocate her instantaneous consumption expenditure between 
standard good and quality good. It doesn’t mean that young people have no 
consumption decision. They consume with budget e  if they do not go to 
school. But we assume for simplicity that they can only consume the 
standard good.13 Hence, they simply spend all of their income e  on the 
standard good in order to maximize their instantaneous utility.  
 
We begin our analysis from the second stage of the individual’s decision 
problem. There is no saving. All income of old people except for the 
education lump-sum tax is spent either on the consumption of the standard 
good or the quality good. Every old individual can consume one and only 
one unit of the quality good jq . There is no limitation to the consumption of 
the standard good ix  except for the budget constraint, i.e., 
1,011 −=⋅+⋅=− jPxey jii , where the price of standard goods is 1, the 
                                                 
13 This assumption is made to ensure that the potential consumers of quality goods have 
only two types (old poor and old rich). It guarantees that there are only two qualities in the 
market (see Zweimüller and Brunner2005). This assumption also is reasonable. For 
example, we can imagine the quality goods to be automobile, alcohol and/or cigarette, 
which are prohibited for young people.  
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price of the best quality is denoted by 0P  and the second best one’s price is 
1−P . The preference for consumption of the standard good and the quality 
good is given by the following instantaneous utility function: 
 
                         jijiiold qxqxu lnln),(, +=      rpi ,=  and 1,0 −=j           ( 3.1 ) 
 
which can also be expressed as: jjiiold qPeyu ln)ln(, +−−= .  
 
Analogously, we assume the instantaneous utility of young individuals as 
follows: 
 
                            


=
==
ri
pie
u iyoung 0
ln
,                                           ( 3.2 )  
 
Young individuals maximize their life-time utility iU  at the beginning of 
their young period: 
 
                            ioldiyoungi uuU ,, ρ+=                                                      ( 3.3 )  
 
where ρ  is the discount factor. If they decide not to undergo education, 
their life-time utility is poldp ueU ,ln ρ+= . Otherwise, they have 
roldr uU ,ρ= . Suppose rp UU > , all young people are not willing to undergo 
education. Hence, 1→β . Recall that the relative wealth of the rich ( β
β
−
−
1
1 d ) 
increases in β ,  1→β  implies ∞→ry . We assume that the instantaneous 
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utility increases in the income14, hence, ∞→rU , which contradicts 
rp UU > . It implies that rp UU >  cannot be an equilibrium. Analogy, 
rp UU <  cannot be an equilibrium, either. Hence, in equilibrium we must 
have rp UU = , i.e.: 
 
                          )(ln ,, poldrold uue −= ρ                                                      ( 3.4 )  
 
The left hand side of (3.4) is the cost of education, while the right hand side 
is the benefit. In equilibrium both should be equal. Hence, the heterogeneity 
among old consumers (poor and rich) comes from the indifference between 
education and non-education for the young. In this heterogeneous steady 
state, β  is determined by exogenous parameters, although individuals are 
randomly divided between the poor and the rich. 
 
3.2.3 The Pricing Decision of Oligopolists 
 
Firms have all the above information but they are unable to distinguish 
between individuals by income. The strategy which firms can pursue is to 
choose a price while quality is fixed. We concentrate only on the steady 
state where prices are constant over time. The whole market size of 
oligopolists is 1 while only the old individuals can buy quality goods. We 
differentiate between rich and poor consumers of quality goods respectively, 
dropping “old” below. For simplicity, we assume that the consumer prefers 
better quality goods if both quality goods yield the same utility.  
 
                                                 
14 Since we don’t know the price of firms, we can only assume the monotonous relationship 
between the utility and the income. In next section, we analyze price decision of firms, the 
monotony expressed through equations (3.18) and (3.19) can then be proven. 
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Lemma 3.1: There are only two kinds of pricing equilibria: In the pooling 
equilibrium the best quality good is sold to both the rich and the poor, the 
second best quality good can’t be sold; in the separating case the best 
quality good is consumed by the rich and the second best quality good is 
consumed by the poor. 
 
Proof: see Appendix 3.1. 
 
The second best quality supplier considers only how to attract the poor to 
purchase her good while the rich never buy the second best good in 
equilibrium, according to Lemma 3.1. Because of the existence of potential 
competitors which offer the price at marginal cost, the highest price which 
the second best firm offers satisfies: 
 
                           211 ln)ln(ln)ln( −−− +−−=+−− qwaeyqPey pp                 ( 3.5 )    
 
The left hand side of this equation is the utility when poor individuals buy 
the second best quality good 1−q  and the right hand side is the utility when 
they consume the third best quality good 2−q . Only if the second best 
quality good can yield at least the same utility as the third best quality good 
to consumers, the consumer prefers buying it. Substituting 21 −− = kqq  and 
rearranging the equation, we get the highest price of the second best quality 
good:  
 
                              
k
waey
k
P p +−−=− ))(11(1                                           ( 3.6 ) 
 
The lowest price which the second best quality firm can offer is at marginal 
cost wa . Analogously, the best firm can set its highest price satisfying:      
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                              1100 ln)ln(ln)ln( −− +−−=+−− qPeyqPey ii                   ( 3.7 )    
leading to              rpi
k
Pey
k
P i ,,))(
11( 10 =+−−= −                                  ( 3.8 ) 
 
These two reaction functions are depicted in Figure 3.1. In order to attract 
the poor to buy its products the best firm sets its price as high as 
k
Pey
k p
1))(11( −+−−  (it is the line CD in Figure 1). Because the rich can afford 
more good quality goods than the poor, they are willing to buy the best good 
too if the poor prefer the best good to the second best good. Hence, the area 
below CD (including CD) is the pooling strategy case, where the best 
quality good captures the entire market and the second best quality good is 
not sold. Above CD the poor don’t purchase the best quality good. The line 
AB in Figure 3.1 expresses the highest price of the best good, given 1−P , if 
the best firm wants to attract only the rich. Hence, the area ABCD excluding 
the line CD is the separating strategy. 
 
        0P                                                                B            k
Pey
k r
1))(11( −+−−  
                                                                                                     
                               A                                          D            
k
Pey
k p
1))(11( −+−−                                          
                                                                                                          
                               C  
                                                    
 
                              
                                  wa              
k
waey
k p
+−− ))(11(              1−P                                                 
                         Figure 3.1: Pricing decision of quality goods firms 
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We define the profit of firms as  ))(( jfirmofsharemarketwaPjj −=π  
, 1,0 −=j . The firms set their prices as high as possible given the market 
share of their goods. The two possible equilibria in price competition are 
summarized below: 
 
1. Pooling: 0q  is sold to all consumers. In this case the second best firm 
becomes the potential competitor and its price and profit are 
respectively:  
 
                               waP =−1                                                          ( 3.9 )                
                               01 =−π                                                           ( 3.10 )  
 
The best firm can set its price at: 
 
                               
k
waey
k
P p +−−= ))(11(0                              ( 3.11 )    
and earn profit       ))(11(0 waeyk p
−−−=π                               ( 3.12 ) 
 
2.     Separating:  0q  is sold to the rich and 1−q  to the poor. Because this is a 
repeated game until a new inventor comes in, many possible equilibria 
could exist. In order to get a unique result, we assume that no player is 
punished if she changes her price without affecting the other player’s 
profit. Then the single separating equilibrium is point B: 
 
                    
k
waey
k
P p +−−=− ))(11(1                                                  ( 3.13 )   
                    220 ))(
1())(11(
k
waey
k
key
k
P pr +−−+−−=                        ( 3.14 ) 
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                    )( 11 waP −= −− βπ                                                            ( 3.15 ) 
                    ))(1( 00 waP −−= βπ                                                        ( 3.16 )  
 
Proof:   see Appendix 3.2. 
 
3.2.4 Innovation 
 
As mentioned before, the new entrant of this oligopolistic market should do 
research before production. Only after the successful innovation it can 
produce a quality k -times better than the currently best. Following the work 
by Aghion and Howitt (1992), we assume that the innovation is random and 
arrives according to a Poisson process with parameter φ . The researcher can 
employ n  workers to reach the Poisson arrival rate φ , i.e., nλφ = , where 
λ  is the productivity of workers in research, which is given by the 
technology of research. This assumption of innovation means that the 
success of research depends only on current input, not upon past research. 
The flow of research cost is wn . And the flow of research benefit is Bφ , 
where B  is the present value of future profits when innovation takes place: 
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where t  is a time index, ee nλφ =  is the expected future arrival rate of 
innovation, and en  is the expected future number of workers in the research 
sector.   
 
We are now in a position to define V . We assume that the firms’ profits net 
of interest payments and research costs consist of average wealth, i.e., 
VwnV θππ −−+=∆ −10 , where V∆  presents the difference of the average 
wealth between two subsequent periods. V  can be interpreted as the 
aggregate value of firms. According to our assumption this wealth is 
distributed among old individuals according to their education level.   
   
3.3 Equilibria   
 
The general equilibrium, which consists of three conditions, is presented in 
this section. Substituting the price decisions of firms into equilibrium 
conditions, we obtain two possible equilibria: the pooling and the 
separating. 
 
3.3.1 Equilibrium Conditions 
 
The equilibrium condition of the education decision is given by equation 
(3.4). Substituting the pooling price (3.11) and the separating prices (3.13), 
(3.14) in (3.4), respectively, we get the same form as follows: 
 
                             


 +−−
−= 1)(lnln
waey
yyk
e
p
prρ                                        ( 3.18 )  
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leads to                








+−−+
−
−
= 11
1
lnln
waedVw
dVk
e θ
βθρ                                ( 3.19 )    
 
From (3.19) we know the interdependence between β  and d . The left hand 
side of (3.19) is the education cost and the right hand side is the benefit 
from education. If we improve the relative wealth of the poor ( d  rises), py  
increases and ry  decrease. In other words, the benefit of education declines. 
Therefore, young people have less of an incentive to undergo education. 
This means ceteris paribus a higher population share of the poor. We 
assume now that d  is exogenous and β  is endogenous. In section 3.5, we 
discuss the impact of an exogenous β  on the innovation rate, given that d  
is endogenous. 
 
Lower time preference ρ  indicates more impatience. Hence, fewer 
individuals invest in education, which means a higher β . The effect of e  on 
β  is not so obvious. At first, e  is the education cost. The increase in the 
education cost decreases the incentive of education for the young. Hence, β  
increases. This is the effect of e  on the left hand side of equation (3.19). On 
the other hand, e  is also a social transfer from the old to the young. The old 
becomes poorer if e  increases. Hence, the marginal utility of education 
increases, i.e., pr yy −  yields more utility if y  is lower. This induces a 
lower β . If e  is not so large, the latter effect is dominated by the former. 
We can proof that β  increases in e  if it satisfies the following sufficient 
condition: 
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Assumption 3.1         ρ+
−≤
1
wawe                                                         ( 3.20 ) 
 
Proof: see Appendix 3.3.    
 
For the research sector we assume free entry and perfect foresight for firms 
in equilibrium, which is analogous to Aghion and Howitt (1992). Hence, the 
innovation equilibrium condition means that the flow of research costs 
should be equal to the flow of expected profits, i.e. nBBwn λφ ==  and 
eφφ =  (or, enn = ) due to perfect foresight. This leads to: 
 
                                    2
10
)( θφ
φπ
θφ
π
λ +++=
−w                                         ( 3.21 ) 
 
The underlying intuition is similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992). The left 
hand side of equation (3.21) represents the flow cost of research per 
efficient worker, which decreases in the productivity of research workers λ . 
The effect of λ  on φ  is positive, because the researcher employs more 
workers to do research, if the productivity of workers increases. The interest 
rate affects the innovation rate via two channels: first it is a discount factor, 
hence, the higher θ , the lower is the benefit of research. Therefore, the 
innovation rate decreases in the interest rate. On the other hand, higher θ  
means more interest income of individuals, which increases the profit of 
firms. Hence, the benefit of research increases. This implies the positive 
impact on the innovation rate. The main difference between our model and 
that of Aghion and Howitt (1992) lies in the market structure. They assume 
a monopoly market. Hence, firms can survive only until a successful 
inventor comes in. Hence, there is no 1−π . In our oligopoly model firms can 
exist in two stages: best quality supplier and second best supplier. Note that 
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in the pooling case 01 =−π , which is equivalent to the case of the monopoly 
in Aghion and Howitt (1992).   
 
The income of the education sector e)1( β−  originates from students, and 
the education sector employs workers to supply courses. We assume the 
labour demand of the education sector is S , thus, the cost of the education 
sector is wS . In equilibrium the budget of the education sector should be 
balanced: wSe =− )1( β .  
 
The labour market equilibrium condition is standard, i.e., at any point in 
time the labour supply should be equal to the labour demand:  
 
                           Sxxeban rp +−++++= ))1((1 βββ                   ( 3.22 )  
which implies:                      Vw θππλ
φ −+= −10                                  ( 3.23 ) 
 
By assumption, each old individual supplies one unit of labour, so the total 
labour supply is 1. The total labour demand is illustrated by the right hand 
side of equation (3.22): n  is the labour demand in the research sector. The 
quality good sector needs labour a , because the total demand for quality 
goods is 1 and the unit labour demand of quality goods is a . 
)1( βββ −++ rp xxe  is the total demand for standard goods, which consists 
of three parts: the non-students’ demand, and the demand of the poor and 
the rich. Recall that b  is the unit labour demand of standard goods, hence, 
the third item of the right hand side of equation (3.22) measures the demand 
for labour in the standard goods sector. Finally S  is the labour demand of 
the education sector. Recall that λ
φθππ wVV −−+=∆ −10 . Hence, (3.23) 
implies that in a stationary equilibrium, the average wealth V  remains 
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constant ( 0=∆V ). Now we have three equations (3.19) (3.21) (3.23) in the 
three variables β , φ  and V . We omit the discussion of equilibrium 
existence condition, because it is similar to that in Zweimüller and Brunner 
(2005). 
 
3.3.2 The Pooling Equilibrium 
  
Substituting price and profit equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12) and 
(3.13), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), respectively, in the above equilibria conditions 
(3.21), (3.23) leads to two different equilibria, namely “Pooling” and 
“Separating”. We discuss the simple case first.  
 
Pooling equilibrium: 
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It is of interest to see the impact of e , ρ , d  on the equilibrium value of 
variables β , φ  and V . If we substitute (3.24) in (3.25), then λ
wV =∗ . 
Hence, de ,, ρ  have no impact on ∗V  . We depict these equations below in 
Figure 3.2. In the pooling equilibrium (3.24) and (3.25) are independent of 
β . This simplifies the analysis. The right hand side of Figure 3.2 shows just 
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the model with an exogenous β , which is the special case in my model 
without (3.19).  
 
                                                       V  
                                                     
                                  (3.19)                                                      (3.24) 
                                                      *V  
 
                                                                                                 (3.25)                                                      
 
 
     β                                       ∗β       0                         ∗φ                      φ                                               
Figure 3.2:  The pooling equilibrium 
 
When e  increases, the opportunity cost of education increases (dotted line 
in Figure 3.2). This means that fewer young people undergo education. 
Hence, ∗β  increases under the assumption 1. On the other hand, e  is a 
transfer from the old to the young, viz. to those who cannot buy quality 
goods. It is equivalent to say that the consumer of the quality good becomes 
poorer. A lower willingness to pay translates into a reduced price and less 
profit from quality goods. This, in turn, leads to a lower incentive to 
innovate.  
 
If ρ  increases, then ∗β  decreases, because the young are more patient and 
thus more of them invest in education. However, it does not necessarily 
imply a higher innovation rate, because in the pooling equilibrium the 
market of the best quality goods is made up of the whole population of old 
people, the change of ∗β  does not change the market share and profits of 
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the best quality good supplier. Hence, there is no impact on the incentive to 
invent.  
 
From equation (3.24) and (3.25) we get θθλλλφ −−+−−= )/11)(/(* kdwea . 
When d  increases, the benefit of education decreases. This leads to fewer 
students, in addition to fewer rich consumers of quality goods. But in the 
pooling equilibrium the market of quality goods is the whole population of 
the old. The profit of firms is independent on the population share of the 
poor. Moreover, the decisive consumer in the price decision is the poor. The 
improvement of their budgets means that they can pay more for quality 
goods. The firm can charge a higher price and earn a larger profit, which 
increases the incentive to innovate. In this sense we can say that 
redistribution (increase in d ) is good for the long-run growth rate (here, a 
higher innovation rate φ ). 
 
We summarise the relationship between inequality and innovation as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 3.1:  
In the pooling equilibrium, the relative wealth of the poor has a positive 
impact on the innovation rate; and the innovation rate is independent on the 
population share of the poor. A higher education cost leads to a lower 
innovation rate.  The time preference ρ  has no impact on the innovation 
rate. 
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3.3.3 The Separating Equilibrium 
 
Now we turn to the separating equilibrium. According to the vertical 
differentiation model of Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), maximization of 
quality differentiation is the optimal choice for firms in order to reduce price 
competition. The target of quality differentiation is to separate the whole 
market into several parts. The firms can then play in some sense a 
monopolistic role. The pooling equilibrium appears only because we assume 
for simplicity that there are two types of consumers. If income is 
continuously distributed among individuals, the pooling equilibrium cannot 
exist any more. Hence, the separating equilibrium is more general and more 
important than the pooling case. We will concentrate on the separating 
equilibrium in following discussion. 
 
In the separating equilibrium 0q  is sold only to the rich and 1−q  is sold only 
to the poor. Hence, β  enters the profit function of firms and the equilibrium 
equations of innovation and labour market. So the analysis is more involved. 
In order to show the impact, we simulate the model in the next section.   
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3.4 Simulation 
 
As equations (3.19), (3.26), (3.27) show, the separating equilibrium is not as 
easy to analyze as the pooling case, because the population share of the poor 
is able to influence the firms’ profits. Our main purpose is to study the 
impact of the income distribution (here measured by d ) on the innovation 
rate φ  and the population share β , as well as the impact of the education 
cost e  and the time preference ρ  on φ  and β . For the purpose of 
simplification, we show the impact by numerically simulating the model. 
 
3.4.1 Simulation Procedure 
 
First, we assume d  to be exogenous and β  to be endogenous. (The reverse 
case is considered in the next section.) In order to show the impact of 
parameter changes and exogenous variables on the endogenous variables, 
we analyze them ceteris paribus. E.g., in order to show the impact of d  on 
V,, βφ , we let d  move away from the benchmark value 0.4 to 0.2 and 0.6, 
respectively, holding the other parameters at the fixed benchmark value (the 
value of d  from 0.2 to 0.6 and the according values of endogenous 
variables are shown in Table 3.2, first part).  
 
We set all parameters and exogenous variables at the following values as a 
benchmark. 4.0,4,1,3.0,2,10,5.0,5.0 ======== dkaew λρθ . They 
are chosen for the following reasons. 50% is the suitable interest rate per 
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period, because the period in the current paper reflects the generation. In 
reality it is about 20-30 years. We also assume the subjective discount rate  
5.0=ρ , which reflects the time preference between young and old periods. 
The basic income w  and the education cost e  are set to satisfy Assumption 
1. We choose 3.0=a  so that total labour supply is almost equally allocated 
among research, quality good production and the standard good sector. The 
other two parameters characterizing research and innovation -- k,λ -- are 
chosen only for simplicity, because we know very little about such 
characteristics in this pure theoretical model.  
 
3.4.2 Simulation results 
 
The simulation result is summarized as below Proposition 3.2 and Table 3.2: 
 
Proposition 3.2:  
In the separating equilibrium, redistribution from the rich to the poor (i.e., 
d  increases) has a negative impact on the innovation rate; the population 
share of the poor increases with the relative wealth of the poor. A higher 
education cost and a lower time preference leads to a lower innovation rate.  
Table 3.2: Simulation results of the separating equilibrium 
with 4.0,4,1,3.0,2,10,5.0,5.0 ======== dkaew λρθ  as benchmark 
d  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.55 0.6 
φ  0.35 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 
β  0.08 0.21 0.34 0.46 0.52 0.57 
V  10.43 11.28 12.34 13.67 14.49 15.45 
θφ
π
+se
sepo V )(0 5.33 6.05 6.91 7.99 8.64 9.51 
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ρ  0.25 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.65 
φ  0.18 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.37 
β  0.83 0.74 0.54 0.34 0.16 0.07 
V  17.91 16.46 14.09 12.34 11.0 10.44 
θφ
π
+se
sepo V )(0 9.47 8.76 7.61 6.91 6.35 6.11 
 
e  1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3 
φ  0.38 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.15 
β  0.15 0.34 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.67 
V  10.92 12.34 13.41 14.26 14.95 15.51 
θφ
π
+se
sepo V )(0 6.34 6.91 7.33 7.66 7.99 8.19 
 
We first check whether the above solution of separating price strategy can 
yield at least as much benefit as under pooling. Otherwise the firm would 
switch to pooling. The benefit from separating is 2
10
)( θφ
πφ
θφ
π
+++
−
se
sese
se
se
, 
which is equal to λ
w  in equilibrium. The benefit from switching to pooling 
given the average wealth level V  in separating equilibrium is θφ
π
+se
sepo V )(0 , 
where indices “se” and “po” refer to separating and pooling, respectively. 
The necessary condition for separating to occur is: 10)(0 =≤+ λθφ
π wV
se
sepo
. 
Parameter values satisfy this condition, see above Table. 
 
As opposed to the pooling case we have two different results in a separating 
equilibrium: 
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1) An increase in d  still implies less education, but no longer large 
incentives to innovate, because the consumer determining the profit of 
the best quality good is the rich. The lower education, the fewer rich 
individuals exist. d  has a direct negative impact on the relative wealth 
of the rich VdAr β
β
−
−=
1
1 , and an indirect positive impact on it via β  
and V . According to this simulation, the net effect is positive. Hence, 
the best quality supplier faces a smaller market share and a higher 
willingness to pay. However, the positive effect on the consumers’ 
willingness to pay is dominated by the negative effect on the market 
share. Thus, the profit of the best quality supplier decreases in d . On 
the other hand, the second best quality supplier has a higher demand. 
The population share of the poor increases and their willingness to pay 
has been improved. Intuitively, the profit of the best quality is more 
important, because it has a bigger weight than that of second best 
quality in the equation of present value calculation (3.21). Hence, the 
relative wealth of the poor has a net negative impact on the innovation 
rate. For the simulation results of the impact of d  on rA , 0π , 1−π  and 
their weights see Appendix 4. The increase in d  delays the realization 
of profits ( 0π  decreases and 1−π  increases). Hence, less research is 
undergone. It implies the lower research cost and the higher V , 
according to (3.23).  
 
2) An increase in ρ  results in more education in the young generation, 
and therefore increases the share of the rich in the old generation. 
Hence, the profit of the best quality increases and the profit of the 
second best quality declines. Again because the profit of the best 
quality good has a large weight in the valuation of innovation, firms 
have thus more incentives to innovate when they face an increasing 
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population share of the rich. This impact of the population share on 
innovation does not appear in the pooling case, where the best quality 
good is sold to the entire population of the old generation. More 
incentive to innovate implies more labour in research sector. Hence, 
the research cost increases and the value of oligopolists (V ) decreases. 
 
The effect of the education cost e  is similar as in the case of pooling, but 
the reason is different. An increase in e  impedes individuals to accept 
education, so that the population share of the rich decreases. Moreover, the 
consumer of the quality good becomes poorer when she has to pay higher 
transfers to young people. Both of them decrease the profit from selling the 
best quality good. But the impact on the second best quality good is a priori 
unclear, because the market share increases and the consumers’ willingness 
to pay decreases. The simulation results suggest that the net effect of 
education cost on innovation is negative.  
  
In order to show that it is crucial to assume interdependence between the 
population share of the poor and the relative income of the poor, we show 
the simulation results of the model given β   exogenously. Then we lose an 
equilibrium condition of education (3.19). For the sake of comparison we 
set 34.0=β , which is the equilibrium value in our simulation benchmark:  
 
                     Table 3.3: The impact of d  on φ  given 34.0=β  
d  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.55 0.6 
φ  0.302 0.308 0.313 0.319 0.322 0.325 
 
This simulation implies that redistribution has a positive effect on 
innovation although it is very weak. An increase in d  improves the 
willingness to pay for the second best quality by the poor. So 1−π  is 
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increasing in d . This in turn allows the best quality producer to charge a 
higher price. On the other hand, the rich becomes poorer with an increase of 
d . If the population share of the rich is big enough, their wealth doesn’t 
reduce strongly when d  increases. The negative effect on 0π  is dominated 
by the positive effect on 1−π . In sum, less inequality in the sense of a higher 
d  is good for innovation. But this effect is weak because 1−π  is lower 
weighted than 0π  in (3.21). From the supply side, the sum of 1−π  and 0π  is 
increasing in d  ( ( ) ( ) 0
²
11110 >

 −−=∂
+∂ −
kk
V
d
θβππ ). There is less 
expenditure for the standard goods. Hence, more labour units can be 
allocated in the research sector, which induces a higher innovation rate.   
Population shares in our model are not constant. The redistribution ( d  
increases) cannot only improve the budget constraint of the poor, but also 
decrease the incentive to education, thus decrease the population share of 
the rich. Hence, a higher d  has two effects on 0π : the direct effect is that it 
decreases the wealth of the rich; the indirect effect is that it reduces the 
market share of the best quality. In other words, the negative effect on 0π  is 
strengthened by the endogenous population share. Although the positive 
effect on 1−π  is also strengthened, its weight in (3.21) is smaller than that of 
best quality good. Hence, as we have seen in the simulation results, the net 
effect of redistribution on innovation is negative when we assume the 
population share is endogenous through education. 
 
Another interesting result from our model is that the education enrollment 
β−1  and the innovation rate φ  are positively correlated although we don’t 
assume that education can increase the productivity. In this sense, education 
looks much more like a tool of distribution, but not like a production factor 
in this paper. However, it can still increase the innovation rate (or growth 
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rate in some sense, see section 3.5) because it produces richer consumers, 
who induce society to allocate more resource in the research sector. 
Normally economists discuss the impact of education only through the 
supply side, i.e., education increases the productivity. Hence, the supply 
increases and the economy will grow. However, Bils and Klenow (2000) 
supply empirical evidence that the human capital (as a production factor) 
which is produced by a higher education level cannot explain the higher 
long-run growth rate which is associated with this higher education level. 
Their explanation is that education is much more like consumption than 
productive investment. Hence, individuals will increase education in the 
young period, if they expect that in the future they will have a higher 
income level. In other words, it is the expected higher long-run growth rate 
that leads to a higher education level today, but not vice versa. Our model 
supplies another explanation for the empirical results of Bils and Klenow 
(2000). If individuals can become richer through education, a higher growth 
rate can be achieved regardless of whether education increases productivity. 
The higher education level is associated with the higher growth rate through 
the demand for better quality goods.   
 
3.5 Exogenous Population Shares and Endogenous 
Relative Income 
 
The above analysis assumes that the income of the poor relative to the 
average level is an exogenous variable and the population share of the poor 
is endogenous. We can also assume that the population share of the poor is 
exogenous and the relative income of the poor is endogenous. These 
different assumptions could imply different policies. We can interpret it as 
follows. If the government wants to decrease the income inequality by 
setting a higher minimum wage or by giving more social transfers, it is 
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similarly to say, d  increases exogenously with respect to our model’s 
analysis. Then we should consider its impact on the innovation rate not only 
through its direct effects on the willingness to pay, but also indirect effects 
through the population share. On the other hand, if government sets up a 
mandatory education law to improve the population share of the student, it 
decreases β  exogenously. Now we discuss what the impact of the 
exogenous β  is on the innovation rate by assuming an endogenous d . The 
simulation results are as follows:     
 
Proposition 3.3:  
In separating equilibrium, a higher population share of the poor has a 
negative impact on the innovation rate. The relative wealth of the poor is 
positively associated with the population share of the poor. 
 
Table 3.4: The impact of the exogenous β  on d,φ , and V  
where 4,1,3.0,2,10,5.0,5.0 ======= kaew λρθ  
β  0.2 0.3 0.34 0.4 0.5 0.6 
φ  0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.25 
d  0.29 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.54 0.63 
V  11.19 11.98 12.34 12.96 14.24 16.0 
θφ
π
+se
sepo V )(0  5.98 6.60 6.91 7.42 8.19 10 
 
In this example, if the government increases the education opportunity (β  
decreases), and in equilibrium all such education opportunities are used by 
individuals, the relative wealth of the poor has to decline in order to push 
individuals to enter school. Because of the increasing population share of 
the rich, the profit of best quality good increases. This in turn raises the 
incentive to invent. 
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What is the impact of inequality (through β  or d , respectively) on utility? 
From (3.1) we have: 
 
                                 
q
q
x
xu ∆+∆=∆                                                      ( 3.28 ) 
 
In a steady state, the consumption of standard goods is constant ( 0=∆x ), 
and qkq )1( −=∆ φ . Hence, we have )1( −=∆ ku φ . The higher the 
innovation rate, the larger is the increase in the utility. Redistribution from 
the rich to the poor ( d  increases exogenously, β  is endogenous) increases 
the price and profit of the quality good, and the average wealth, too. Hence, 
consumers become richer through redistribution and consume more standard 
goods. The production resource, labor, is shifted from the research sector to 
the standard good sector. Consumers enjoy a higher utility level in the short 
run, but the long-run growth rate of the utility is lower than before because 
of a lower innovation rate. In contrast to redistribution, the decrease of the 
population share of the poor can induce a higher innovation rate. Hence, in a 
new equilibrium consumers have lower consumption of standard goods, but 
the long-run growth rate of the utility becomes higher.  
 
3.6 The Model Dynamics 
 
So far, we have only discussed the steady state. The comparative statics 
show us the long-run impact of parameters on the equilibrium. In this 
section we discuss the effect of parameters on the endogenous variables in 
the short run and the medium run, i.e., the path to equilibrium. We focus on 
the case where d  is exogenous and β  is endogenous (the case in section 
3.3 and 3.4). From section 3.2.4, we know that the accumulation function of 
average wealth is:                      
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                             λ
φθππ wVV −−+=∆ −10                                            ( 3.29 ) 
 
The total profits net of the interests payment ( Vθππ −+ −10 ) is the net 
income of firms. λ
φw  is the research cost. If the net income of firms is 
higher than the research cost, the economy can accumulate the average 
wealth.  
 
From equation (3.19) we know: 
 
                           V
VwaedVwd
waewd ∆−−+−
−−−−−=∆
))(1(
))(1)(1(
θ
βββ                    ( 3.30 ) 
 
According to Assumption 3.1, 0>−− waew . Hence, the accumulation of 
the average wealth ( 0>∆V ) enlarges the income gap between the poor and 
the rich. More young people are attracted to education. Hence, the 
population share of the poor declines ( 0<∆β ).   
 
The innovation rate nλφ =  is determined by the number of workers in the 
research sector ( n ). From (3.22) we have:  
 
                              ))1((1 ββ −+−−−= rp xxbeban                               ( 3.31 ) 
 
where { }rpixi ,, ∈  is the consumption of the standard good by the poor and 
the rich, respectively. Because eba −−1  is constant, n  depends only on the 
aggregate consumption of standard goods, i.e., ))1(( ββ −+∆−=∆ rp xxbn . 
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We concentrate on the impact of d  on the dynamics of φβ ,,V . Suppose 
there is a shock ( d  increases). We define the short run as the time just after 
the shock and before any other endogenous change of variables, and the 
medium run as the period when all endogenous variables move 
simultaneously to the long-run equilibrium values. Distinguishing the short 
run from the medium run enables us to study the different effects of the 
shock. The direct effect of d  on the endogenous variables can be observed 
in the short run. The indirect effect of d  through the interaction among the 
endogenous variables takes place in the medium run.  
 
In the short run, when d  increases and V  is still unchanged, β  increases 
(from equation 3.19) because the benefit of education decreases.  
 
The total profits of firms are as follows: 
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Since 0)1(
²
1 >−−=∂
∂∑ V
k
k
d
i θβπ , the total profit of firms increases in d . The 
intuition is as follows: if d  increases, the poor become richer. Thus the firm 
producing the second-best quality goods is able to raise the price without 
losing consumers, which enables the supplier of the best quality good to 
increase her price, too. Hence, an increase in d  raises the profit from 
quality goods. Therefore, the net income of firms is above the total cost of 
research, and 0>∆V  (from (3.29)). 
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From (3.31) we get 0)1(
²
1 >−−=∂
∂ V
k
kb
d
n θβ , i.e., in the short run, the 
effect of d  on the innovation rate is positive. Because V  is kept unchanged 
in the short run, the total income of all consumers doesn’t change. However, 
we know from above that the price of the quality goods increases in d . 
Hence, consumers have to decrease the consumption of the standard goods. 
This leads to more labor input in the research sector and a higher innovation 
rate. 
 
Proposition 3.4:  
In short run, the relative wealth of the poor ( d ) has a positive impact on the 
population share of the poor, the accumulation of the average wealth, and 
the innovation rate.  
 
In the medium run, d  reaches the new level. But the accumulation of the 
average wealth has just started. From (3.29) we get: 
                   
0]1)11)(1[(])1(1)[11( <−−−=−−+−=−∂
∂=∂
∆∂ ∑ d
kkk
d
kVV
V i βθθθβθπ  
 
It indicates that the average wealth does increase, but the change of the 
average wealth is diminishing. According to (3.30), β  decreases in the 
average wealth. Hence, after the immediate jump in the short run the 
population share of the poor declines with the accumulation of the average 
wealth.  
 
From (3.29) we know also: 
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Hence, at first V∆  decreases because of the immediate jump of β  in the 
short run, then increases because β  declines in the medium run. The 
average wealth V  increases before it reaches the equilibrium value in long 
term.  
 
From (3.31) we get 0)]11)(1(1[ <−−−−=∂
∂
k
d
k
b
V
n βθ . The intuition is as 
follows: Because of the accumulation of the average wealth all consumers 
become richer than before, and the demand for standard goods is increasing. 
Hence, more labor units have to be allocated into the standard sector and 
less into research. The innovation rate begins to decrease after the 
immediate increase in the short run. Additionally, we have 
0)(
²
)1( <−−+−−=∂
∂ waedVw
k
kbn θβ . This implies that the decrease of the 
innovation rate in the medium run is accelerated by the immediate jump of 
β  in the short run. 
 
To sum up, after the shock the average wealth increases slowly until it 
reaches a new higher equilibrium value. The population share of the poor 
increases in the short run but then decreases in the accumulation of the 
average wealth. However, our simulation results show that the long-run 
equilibrium value is still higher than before. Because the demand for the 
standard good sinks in the short run, the innovation rate achieves a higher 
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level. In the medium run, the innovation rate decreases because both the 
average wealth and the population share of the poor increase. 
       
3.7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we distinguish between two measures of income inequality, the 
population share of the poor and the relative wealth of the poor. We discuss 
their different impact on the rate of innovation. Our results are established 
on the basis of a model by Zweimüller and Brunner (2005), but we do not 
assume the independence between the population share and the relative 
income. The relaxation of this assumption leads to the novel result that in 
separating equilibrium, the improvement of the relative income of the poor 
impedes the innovation rate, and a decrease of the population share of the 
poor accelerates the rate of innovation.  
 
There are some important implications regarding our result. First, since the 
Gini-coefficient does not differentiate between the relative income of the 
poor and the population share of the poor, it is not suitable for policy 
recommendations. Each different measure of inequality has a different 
impact on economic growth. Second, the interdependent relationship 
between relative income and the population share is very important when 
considering the impact of inequality on growth. Finally, the effect of 
education on growth or innovation is not only due to an increase of 
productivity, which is discussed by most economists, but also due to an 
increase of the demand for better quality. The latter is almost neglected by 
most economists.           
 
We believe that future research should be directed to empirical work 
bringing to focus the relationship between the relative income of the poor 
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and the education enrollment rate. We also need evidence to support the 
argument that education could produce rich consumers, through which the 
education enrollment is positively associated with the growth rate. 
Moreover, the current paper points out that there are possible different 
polices with different effects on the economic growth, e.g., the 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, and the public school. However, the 
more important question is under what conditions society would choose the 
one, which can achieve a higher economic growth rate, as well as a fair 
income distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88
 
 
Chapter 4  
 
Inequality and Growth: a Joint Analysis of 
Demand and Supply 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The relationship between a country’s wealth inequality and its economic 
growth has been a major concern of economists for more than a century. Yet 
it is far from being well understood. In theoretical modelling, the 
distribution of wealth is the relevant inequality source. However, most 
empirical studies use income inequality data as a proxy for wealth inequality 
because of the scarcity of available data on the distribution of wealth.15 “It is 
generally argued that this is unlikely to be a major problem since both 
measures of inequality generally vary together in cross-sections.” (Aghion 
et al. 1999). In the current paper, initial wealth inequality coincides with 
income inequality through human capital investment. 
 
The empirical evidence on this link is ambiguous. Some cross-country 
studies (e.g., Berg and Sachs 1988, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Alesina and 
                                                 
15 There also are studies using other proxies. For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Deininger and Squire (1998) include land inequality along with income inequality, Castelló 
and Doménech (2002) investigate human capital inequality. 
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Rodrik 1994, Clarke 1995) show that income inequality, as a proxy for 
wealth inequality, negatively impacts long-run growth rates. Nonetheless, 
there also is evidence that income inequality has a positive impact on short 
or medium run growth rates (Forbes 2000), and that the relationship 
between income distribution and the long-run growth rate is non-linear 
(Chen 2003, Banerjee and Duflo 2003). The ambiguous empirical results 
imply that there is not a clear relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth (Barro 2000b). Hence, it is important for economists to 
develop models which illustrate the possible different effects of inequality 
on economic growth under different circumstances. The existing theoretical 
wisdom has proposed either a negative or a positive relationship between 
initial wealth inequality and economic growth. Here it will be shown that 
both are extreme cases in an integrating simple model. We further the 
analysis of the relationship between wealth inequality and economic growth 
in two directions.  
 
First, in a simple model with two types of individuals, the poor and the rich, 
the distribution of wealth comprises two variables, namely the relative 
wealth of the poor and the population share of the poor. We argue these 
variables may have different, even opposite effects on economic growth 
under certain conditions. Hence, cross-country evidence which is based on 
the simple regression of the Gini-coefficient on the economic growth rate 
can be ambiguous. In particular, we may be unable to obtain from such 
empirical studies recommendations on redistribution policies for achieving a 
higher economic growth rate as well as a more equal distribution. 
 
Second, we combine the supply of production factors and the demand for 
the new quality goods in a general equilibrium model. Thus, wealth 
inequality in two areas can affect the economic performance: the supply side 
and the demand side. Most of the literature maintains that wealth inequality 
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reduces the aggregate human capital investment, given a neoclassical 
production function of investment and imperfect capital market. 
Consequently, inequality has a negative effect on the supply of consumption 
goods. We name this effect “the supply-side effect”. The main arguments of 
the supply-side effect are included in the survey of Benabou 1996. On the 
other hand, following the literature on endogenous growth with quality-
improving innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1998, Zweimüller et al. 2000) we 
argue that innovation is the engine that drives economic growth. This can 
improve the quality of goods and, in turn, increase the utility of consumers. 
The innovation cost is compensated by the monopolistic profit after 
successful innovation. Thus, the incentive of innovation is the monopolistic 
profit. Wealth distribution can affect the demand for the newly invented 
goods, and subsequently the price and profit of monopolist. We name this 
“the demand-side effect”.  
 
As we assume that there are only two types of individuals, the monopolistic 
supplier of newly invented goods can set the price either at the separating 
level, i.e. only the rich are able to buy it, or at the pooling level that even the 
poor can afford. Because wealth distribution has different effects on the 
profit in both cases, the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth is non-linear. Inequality may give rise to a higher incentive for firms 
to innovate because rich consumers can pay more than the poor for high 
quality goods. However, on the other hand, the relatively small market share 
of high quality goods implied by inequality impedes the spread of better 
quality goods.  
 
This paper shows that in a separating equilibrium, a lower relative wealth of 
the poor is good for innovation, and a larger population share of the poor is 
bad for innovation. This result is consistent with Foellmi et al. (2002) and 
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the 3rd chapter. In Foellmi et al. (2002) hierarchic preferences16 are 
introduced, and innovation induces new goods but does not improve quality. 
The 3rd chapter considers the interdependent relationship between the 
relative wealth of the poor and the population share of the poor. In the 
pooling equilibrium, the lower relative wealth of the poor is bad for 
innovation, and the population of the poor has no effect on innovation. The 
threshold value which distinguishes between these two equilibria depends 
on the strength of the supply-side effect. These findings imply that two 
nations with the same Gini-coefficient could have different economic 
growth rates if their wealth inequality is reached for different reasons (e.g., 
low relative wealth of the poor or large population share of the poor). 
Hence, it is important to decompose the Gini-coefficient in empirical 
research.   
 
This paper integrates two main streams of theory relating growth and 
inequality. Recent surveys of the supply-side effect are by Benabou (1996) 
and Aghion et al. (1999), where three broad categories corresponding to the 
main feature are stressed: imperfect financial market, political economy and 
social unrest. The demand-side effect is illustrated Murphy et al. (1989), 
Foellmi et al. (2002) and Zweimüller et al. (2000 and 2005).   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses briefly 
the measurement of inequality. Section 4.3 lays out the basic framework. In 
section 4.4 we analyze the equilibrium and in Section 4.5 we give an 
example and present some empirical implications with section 4.6 
concluding. 
 
 
                                                 
16 “A hierarchy of wants implies that goods can be ranked according to their priority in 
consumption” (Foellmi et al. 2002) 
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4.2 The Measurement of Inequality 
 
Since Corrado Gini, the Italian statistician, published his paper “Variabilità 
e mutabilità” in 1912, the Gini coefficient is widely used as a measurement 
of inequality. It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with 
perfect equality (everyone has the same wealth) and 1 means perfect 
inequality (one person has all the wealth; everyone else has nothing). The 
Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed in percentage form, and is equal 
to the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100.  
 
The Gini coefficient is calculated as a ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve 
diagram. (see Figure 1(a)). If the area between the line of perfect equality 
and the Lorenz curve is A , and the area beneath the Lorenz curve is B , 
then the Gini coefficient is 
BA
A
+ .  The advantages of using the Gini 
coefficient are clear: It is both scale and population-independent, hence, it 
can be compared across countries and is easily interpreted; by retaining 
anonymity it doesn’t matter who the high and low earners are; last but not 
least, it is simple. However, economies with similar wealth and Gini 
coefficients can still have very different distributions. This is because the 
Lorenz curves may have different shapes and yet yield the same Gini 
coefficient. As an extreme example, an economy where half the households 
have no wealth, and half share the wealth equally has a Gini coefficient of 
5.0  (Lorenz curve abd  in Figure 4.1(b)); but an economy with complete 
wealth equality except for one wealthy household that has half the total 
wealth also has a Gini coefficient of 5.0  (Lorenz curve acd  in Figure 
4.1(b)). In this paper, we address the question: Does the shape of Lorenz 
curve having the same Gini coefficient matter?  
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 Figure 4.1  Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
 
4.3 The Model 
 
We consider a closed economy with two types of individuals: the poor and 
the rich. They work for firms and consume products of firms. There are two 
kinds of goods: standard goods and quality goods. The quality improves 
over time due to innovation. Hence, the innovation rate represents the 
growth rate of quality, but not the growth rate of quantity. In turn, the 
economic growth is the growth of the consumers’ utility, not the output. 
 
4.3.1 The Environment 
 
There is a continuum of individuals at each point in time, who live for two 
periods, young and old. Time is discrete, indexed by ,...,2,1=t . The 
population size of each generation is constant over time and normalized to 
1. Individuals, within as well as across generations, are identical in their 
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preferences. However, they may differ in their family wealth and thus, due 
to the absence of perfect financial markets, in their capacity to invest in 
human capital. For simplicity, we assume that there are two kinds of 
individuals: the poor and the rich, their population shares being β  
( 10 << β ) and  β−1 , respectively. The average wealth of the whole 
society is denoted by V , which is the value of firms. Firms earn a flow 
profit and the value of firms equals the present value of this flow profit.17 
The poor individual has wealth dVAp = , where d  ( 10 << d ) means the 
wealth of the poor relative to the average level V . As a result the rich have  
VdAr β
β
−
−=
1
1 .18 For simplicity, we assume that the wealth should not be 
eaten and can be transferred from generation to generation. Thus, there is no 
social mobility in this simple model. At birth, a young individual i  receives 
an amount of dividend iAθ , where θ  is a constant dividend rate. Therefore, 
the wealth distribution is equivalent to the distribution of the initial income 
of the young people.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the resulting Lorenz-curve. Given our assumptions, the 
Lorenz-curve is piecewise linear. The Gini-coefficient of the wealth, as well 
as that of the income of the young is β)1( d− , (see Appendix 4.1). Both an 
increase in the population share of the poor and a decrease in relative wealth 
of the poor can increase the inequality level of the wealth. However, we 
claim that they have different effects on the economic growth. 
 
                                                 
17 See section 4.3.3 and 4,3.4. 
18 According to the definition of the average wealth, )1( ββ −+= rp AAV . After 
substituting dVAp =  and rearranging, we have VdAr β
β
−
−=
1
1 . 
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There are four sectors in the economy. The education sector produces 
skilled labor which is the only production factor and is expressed by the 
efficient labor unit denoted by L . The education sector is run as a non-profit 
organization. It collects an education fee H  from young individuals and 
hires S  efficient labor units from old individuals to teach. The more that 
young individuals invest in the education sector, the more efficient labor 
units of old generation will be employed as teachers. As a result, more 
efficient labor units can be produced for the next period. Following 
education, young individuals have L  units of efficient labor, which can be 
used in four sectors when individuals are old. 
  
            1                                                                                      C    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      D                          βd  
 
          A                                                                                       B   
             0                                                   β                            1 
Figure 4.2  The wealth distribution 
 
Two production sectors produce two kinds of goods, referred to as standard 
goods and quality goods, respectively. Let x  be the quantity of the standard 
goods, which has a constant quality (normalized to 1) and is traded in a 
competitive market. Hence, the price xP  is equal to its marginal cost which 
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is also normalized to 1. The marginal cost of the standard goods can be 
expressed as wb , where the unit labor demand is b . This determines how 
many units of efficient labor are needed to produce one unit of standard 
goods. w  is the wage rate of the efficient labor unit. We get 1== wbPx . 
 
In the quality goods sector, one monopolist produces the best quality goods. 
Anyone is allowed to produce competitively any other quality goods. We 
denote the quality level as ,...2,1,0 −−=jq j , where 0q  is the best quality, 
1−q  is the second best one and so on. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity: 
11 >= − kkqq jj . Despite the different qualities, the quality goods have the 
same marginal cost wa , where a  is again the unit labor demand. Since all 
quality goods except the best quality are sold on a competitive market, they 
have the same price ,...2,1, −−== jwaPj , and the monopolist sets 0P  to 
maximize her profit. For convenience, we assume that every consumer can 
consume one and only one unit of quality goods. 
 
The new quality good is invented by the research sector. The research sector 
needs n  units of efficient labor to achieve the innovation rate, φ , which is 
the probability of success. Each successful innovation introduces a k -times 
better quality good than the existing best one in the next period. The 
authority to produce this best quality will be sold to one monopolist. After 
successful innovation the current best quality becomes the second best 
quality in the next period. Hence, any competitor can produce it. Since in 
equilibrium the amount of consumption is constant, the economic growth 
throughout this model is not the growth of quantity, but of quality. Here the 
innovation rate φ  represents this growth rate of quality. Later on, we will 
see that the growth rate of quality also is that of the consumers’ utility. 
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The assumption of two kinds of goods, one with constant quality and the 
other with constant quantity, is an abstract of two dimensions of 
consumption. In reality the quality of each of the goods can be improved 
and there is no limit that consumers can only consume one unit. However, 
we can still find goods whose quality consumers readily appraise: 
automobiles for instance. Normally we have one car. However, we 
sometimes buy a new, better quality car, and sell the old one in order to 
improve our utility. There are other goods about whose quantity consumers 
also readily appraise, for example, leisure.   
 
4.3.2 The Household’s Decision Problem 
 
As we assumed in last section, a young individual i  has initial income iAθ  
at birth which can be used to buy standard goods19 1ix  at the price 1 and 
invest in education iH . The production function of efficient labor is 
)1(,)( <+= ααii HlHL 20, where l  ( 0>l ) is constant and represents the 
basic supply of labor without any education. The αiH  are the efficient labor 
units produced by the human capital investment, iH , which is the choice 
variable of the young individual i . This production function is a strictly 
concave increasing function satisfying the neoclassical boundary conditions, 
and lL =)0( . For simplicity, we assume that l  is equal to the unit labor 
                                                 
19 This assumption ensures only two kinds of consumers in the quality goods market. 
Allowing young people to be able to buy quality goods will not change our result 
qualitatively, but complicate the analysis, because then there are four types of consumers in 
the quality goods market. This assumption also is reasonable. For example, we can imagine 
the quality goods to be automobile, alcohol and/or cigarette, which are prohibited for young 
people.  
20 It is a closed form of αSllL '+= , where 'l  is a constant parameter and S  the labor 
units of teachers. Since the education sector has no profit, H  is totally paid for teaching. 
Hence, SwH = . For simplicity, we assume αwl =' . Thus, the closed form for the 
production function of labor is  αHlL += . 
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demand of quality good:  al = , which simplifies the calculation without 
loss of generality. Hence,  
                             )1(,)( <+= ααii HaHL                                         ( 4.1 ) 
 
In the second period, old individual i  has iL  units of efficient labor. We 
assume a simplistic view regarding the production of consumption goods. 
Efficient labor is the single productive factor, and every individual 
inelastically supplies all of her efficient labor units to the competitive labour 
market. As a result, incomes of the poor and the rich in the second period 
are respectively: rpiwLy ii ,, == . In section 4.4, we will show that the 
poor invest less than the rich. Hence, rp LL < , in turn, rp yy < . It means 
that there is no social mobility in our simple model. 
 
We assume the instantaneous utility function in the first period to be 
11 ln ii xu = . Because the standard good is the single good which young people 
can consume. Substituting the budget constraint in the first period 
iii HxA += 1θ , we have: 
 
                             )ln(1 iii HAu −= θ                                                        ( 4.2 ) 
 
There is no saving for the old individual. All income is spent both on the 
consumption of the standard good and the quality good. Every individual 
can consume one and only one unit of the quality good jq . There is no limit 
to the consumption of the standard good 2ix  except for the budget constraint, 
i.e., ,...1,011 2 −=⋅+⋅= jPxy jii , where the price of standard goods is 1, 
the quantity of standard goods is 2ix  and the price of the quality j  is 
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denoted by jP . The preference for consumption of the standard good and 
the quality good is given by the following utility function: 
 
                      jijii qxqxu lnln),( 222 +=      rpi ,=  and 1,0 −=j                ( 4.3 ) 
 
By substituting the budget constraint in the second period, (4.3) can be 
expressed as:  
                                 
                             jjii qPyu ln)ln(
2 +−=                                                 ( 4.4 )                
 
The life-time utility function of individual i  is assumed to be: 
                  
                             21 iii uuU ρ+=                                                              ( 4.5 ) 
 
where ρ  is the subjective discount factor. It can, but need not necessarily, 
be equal to θ+1
1 , where θ  is the dividend rate. The old individual i  
chooses the quality level jq  to maximize 
2
iu , given income iy  being 
constant. By backward induction, when the subject is young she chooses iH  
to maximize her life-time utility (4.5) with the rational expectation that jq  
will be optimally determined in the second period. Hence, in order to solve 
the household’s decision problem, we need to know the price of the quality 
good. 
 
4.3.3 The Pricing Decision of the Monopolist 
 
Firms have all the above information but are unable to distinguish between 
individuals based on income. The strategy which firms can pursue is to 
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choose a price while quality is fixed. We concentrate only on the steady 
state where prices are constant over time. First of all, only the most recent 
old quality good ( 1−q ) can be sold at the price wa  in the competitive market 
of quality goods 0<jq j . Hence, the price that the monopolist can offer has 
to satisfy the condition: 
 
                           100 ln)ln(ln)ln( −+−≥+− qwayqPy ii                               ( 4.6 )    
 
The left hand side of (4.6) is the utility when individuals buy the best quality 
good 0q  and the right hand side is the utility when they consume the second 
best quality good 1−q . Further, we assume that the consumer prefers better 
quality goods if both quality goods yield the same utility. Substituting 
10 −= kqq  and rearranging (4.6), we get the highest price 0P  of the best 
quality good:  
                                      
                             rpi
k
way
k
P i ,)
11(0 =+−=                                        ( 4.7 ) 
                                               
The monopolist thereby has two possible price strategies -- either to set the 
price high, to attract only the rich consumers (separating price), or, low to 
occupy the entire market (pooling price). The instantaneous profits are as 
follows: 
 
                            ))(11)(1( way
k
sep
r
sep −−−= βπ                                    ( 4.8 ) 
  
                            ))(11( way
k
pool
p
pool −−=π                                            ( 4.9 ) 
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The monopolist sets the separating price in steady state, if 1) given the 
separating strategy before, she has no incentive to deviate, which means: 
 
                               ααβ )())(1( seppsepr HH ≥−                                         ( 4.10 ) 
 
2) the profit of separating strategy in steady state is larger than that of the 
pooling, viz.: 
 
                               ααβ )())(1( poolpsepr HH ≥−                                       ( 4.11 ) 
 
Since the supplier of the best quality goods is monopolistic, it has a positive 
flow profit. All other firms have zero profit and their value also is zero. All 
firms are owned by individuals.  Hence, the value of this monopolistic firm 
is equal to V . 
 
4.3.4 Innovation 
 
As mentioned earlier, the quality improves over time due to innovation. 
Following the work by Aghion and Howitt (1992), we assume that the 
innovation is random and arrives according to a Poisson process with 
parameter φ . The researcher can employ n  units of efficient labor to reach 
the Poisson arrival rate φ , i.e., nλφ = , where λ  is the productivity of 
efficient labor in research. Hence, the flow of research cost is wn . This 
assumption of innovation means that the success of research depends only 
on current input, not upon past research.  
 
Once innovation succeeds, a new quality good is invented. This newly 
invented good is k -times better than the current best quality good, and can 
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be produced by one monopolist in the next period. The authority to produce 
this new best quality good is sold to the monopolist via a simple auction. 
We assume that researchers prefer to sell the authority to the incumbent as 
long as its offer is at least the same as that of others. In order to keep this 
priority, the incumbent has to buy the new innovation from researchers at a 
price which is equal to the present value of the future monopolistic profit. 
Thus, we have a single monopolist who produces the best quality in every 
period. The price paid by the monopolist to the research sector is the flow of 
research benefit, Bφ , where φ  is the probability of success and B  is the 
present value of the future monopolistic profit: 
                         
          ( ) { }∑
∞
= 



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
+
=
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( )∑
∞
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Leading to                  θφ
π
+= eB                                                        ( 4.12 )                                  
 
where t  is a time index, ee nλφ =  is the expected future arrival rate of 
innovation, en  is the expected future number of efficient labor units in the 
research sector, and θ  is interest rate. The sum of the interest rate and the 
innovation rate is the discount factor of the monopolistic profit. In steady 
state, all agents have perfect foresight. Consequently, eφφ =  (or, enn = ).  
 
Now we are in a position to define the average wealth of the whole society 
V . As we mentioned before, the average wealth is the value of monopolistic 
firm, which can generate dividends Vθ  in each period. Hence, the per 
period increase in the average wealth is the monopolistic profit net of the 
dividend and the payment to the researcher.   
 103
 
                                     BVV φθπ −−=∆                                             ( 4.13 ) 
 
4.4 Equilibrium 
 
According to section 4.3.3 there are two possible equilibria, namely 
separating and pooling respectively. If the monopolist chooses the 
separating strategy, then the poor buy 1−q  and the rich consume 0q . Hence, 
the rich young people maximize their life-time utility as follows: 
                             
                   )ln))((ln()ln(max 00 qPHyHAU rrrrrHr
+−+−= ρθ  
 
substituting (4.7) in this equation and solving the first order condition, we 
have: 
 
                                 sepr
sep
r AH θαρ
αρ
+= 1                                               ( 4.14 ) 
 
Similarly,                 sepp
sep
p AH θαρ
αρ
+= 1                                              ( 4.15 ) 
 
If the monopolist chooses the pooling price, then the poor set the optimal 
investment at: 
                                                    
                                 poolp
pool
p AH θαρ
αρ
+= 1                                           ( 4.16 ) 
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αρ
αρ
+1  is the saving rate of the young people. The results (4.14) - (4.16), 
consistent with Bénabou (1996), reflect the fact that the poor invest less in 
human capital than the rich. Due to the neoclassical production function of 
human capital investment, (4.1), the marginal productivity of the human 
capital investment of the poor is higher than that of the rich. Hence, the 
inequality of initial wealth reduces the aggregate supply of efficient labor 
units. This is the negative supply-side effect.  
 
Substituting (4.14) and (4.16) in (4.8) and (4.9), we have  
 
                   αθαρ
αρβπ )
1
()11)(1( sepr
sep Aw
k +−−=                                  ( 4.17 ) 
                   αθαρ
αρπ )
1
()11( poolp
pool Aw
k +−=                                          ( 4.18 )                                   
 
The instantaneous profit of the monopolist in the separating equilibrium 
depends on the initial wealth of the rich young people. Analogously, the 
profit in the pooling equilibrium depends on the wealth of the poor.  
 
Furthermore, we assume free entry in the research sector, which is the 
traditional assumption of the quality-improving model, to obtain the 
research arbitrage equation (Aghion and Howitt 2004). Hence, Bwn φ= , 
where wn  is the flow cost of the research sector and Bφ  is the flow benefit 
(see section 4.3.4). This leads to: 
 
                                 θφ
π
λ +=
w                                                              ( 4.19 ) 
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The underlying intuition is similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992). The left 
hand side of equation (19) represents the flow cost of research in order to 
achieve a successful innovation, which decreases in the productivity of 
research workers λ . The effect of λ  on φ  is positive because the 
researcher is able to achieve a higher innovation rate with the same number 
of efficient labor units if their productivity increases. The effect of the 
interest rate is ambiguous. First, it is a discount factor. Hence, the higher θ , 
the lower the research benefit. Therefore, the innovation rate decreases in 
the interest rate. The other way through in which the interest rate can affect 
the innovation rate is, by raising the initial income of individuals. Hence, the 
higher θ , the larger the human capital and consequently, the larger the 
monopolistic profit. It has a positive effect on the innovation rate. 
 
As the single production factor, the supply of efficient labor units should be 
equal to the demand for efficient labor units in equilibrium. The total 
efficient labor supply is rp LL )1( ββ −+ , which is equal to 
αα ββ rp HHa )1( −++ . The demand for efficient labor consists of four 
parts. First, the research sector needs n . Second, the quality goods sector 
needs a  because every consumer consumes one unit of quality good. Third, 
the standard goods sector needs ))1(( 221 rp xxxb ββ −++ . And finally, the 
education sector needs S . Hence, the total demand for efficient labor units 
is Sxxban rp +−+++ ))1(( ββ . In equilibrium, the labor market clearing 
condition is as follows: 
 
                  SxxbanLL rprp +−+++=−+ ))1(()1( ββββ                  ( 4.20 ) 
 
Solving (4.20) yields          Vwn θπ +=                                               ( 4.21 ) 
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Proof: see Appendix 4.2. 
 
From (4.19), (4.21) and nλφ =  we know that the average wealth λ
wV =∗  in 
equilibrium regardless of the price strategy of the monopolist. The higher 
the wage rate, the greater is the average wealth. This is because the high 
wage rate involves the rich consumer (recalling that the old people are the 
consumer of quality goods, their income is given by rpiwLy ii ,== , 
which depends on the wage rate). Then the monopolist can set a high price 
and earn more profit (see equations 4.17 and 4.18). The larger λ , the higher 
is the innovation rate. Thus, the value of the monopolistic firm is less.  
 
After substituting (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) into (4.10) and (4.11), and using 
λ
wV =∗ , we get the unique condition of the separating price in equilibrium: 
 
                                   1)1()1( 1 ≥−− − αα ββ
d
                                        ( 4.22 ) 
 
This condition shows that the larger the population share of the poor, and/or 
the richer the poor, the less probable will the monopolist choose the 
separating price strategy. The larger the α , the bigger the difference of 
income of old individuals. Hence, more probably will the separating price 
be chosen.  
                               
Rearranging (4.19) and substituting (4.17) and (4.18), we have two possible 
innovation rates in the separating and the pooling equilibria respectively:  
 
                    θθαρ
αρβλφ α −+−−= )1)(1)(
11( r
sep A
k
                             ( 4.23 ) 
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                    θθαρ
αρλφ α −+−= )1)(
11( p
pool A
k
                                      ( 4.24 )  
 
where λλβ
β dwAwdA pr =−
−= ,
)1(
)1( . 
Proposition  4.1 
The effect of wealth inequality on the innovation rate is non-linear and 
ambiguous:  
1) Given β  constant, the effect of d  on φ  is negative for ],0[ ∗∈ dd  and 
positive for ]1,[ ∗∈ dd . The threshold value )1,0(∈∗d  satisfies 
1)1()1( 1 =−− ∗− αα ββ d . 
2) Given d  constant, the effect of β  on φ  is negative for ],0[ ∗∈ ββ . In 
the pooling case ]1,[ ∗∈ ββ , β  has no effect on φ . The threshold value 
)1,0(∈∗β  satisfies 1)1()1( 1 =−− ∗−∗ αα ββ
d
. 
 
The non-linear relationship between initial income inequality and economic 
growth has two interpretations in the current model: For one, d  and β  have 
different effects on the innovation rate. For the other, both the effect of d  
and that of β  on φ  are non-linear. Inequality can affect the innovation rate 
not only through the supply of the production factor (here, labor) but also 
the demand for the new better quality. The supply-side effect is discussed by 
most economists. Here, we assume the strictly concave increasing 
production function of labor and an imperfect capital market as in the 
literature; hence, the negative effect of inequality on growth is not 
surprising (see Appendix 4.3). The parameter α  is a measure of the strength 
of the supply-side effect.  
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Figure 4.3 shows different effects of the relative wealth of the poor on the 
innovation rate in two extreme cases. Both are the examples where the 
supply-side effect disappears. Suppose 0→α , then the saving rate of the 
young people ( αρ
αρ
+1 ) approaches zero. Both the poor and the rich young 
people have little incentive to invest in human capital. Hence, the difference 
in income for the old people approaches zero. The threshold value 0→∗d . 
The monopolist faces a more equally distributed society and thus sets the 
pooling price. Consequently, the income of the poor is crucial for the price 
of the quality good. In this case, if the poor have more income, then the 
price of the quality good increases. Finally, the innovation rate increases. 
The effect of d  on φ  is overall positive in the case of (a). 
 
  φ                                                         φ  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
                                                   d                                      
β+=
∗
1
1d               d  
                                                                                                                    
                       0)( →αa                                        1)( →αb   
                    Figure 4.3  The pure demand-side effect of d  on φ  
 
The picture is reversed, if 1→α , β+→
∗
1
1d , i.e., β
β
+→
∗
1
2
Gini . Since 
2
1
1
1 >+ β , we can argue that d  has negative effect on the innovation rate 
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over the most range through the demand side. If the condition (4.22) holds, 
then the poor are too poor and/or the population of the poor is too small. 
Hence, the monopolist sets the separating price to sell the best quality good 
only to the rich. In this case, if the rich become poorer and the poor become 
richer ( d  increases), i.e., if the Gini-coefficient decreases given constant β , 
then this inequality brings about less incentive for the researcher to innovate 
because of falling profits. If  d  increases further and exceeds the threshold 
value β+1
1 , the monopolist sets the pooling price and then d  has a positive 
effect on the innovation rate φ . This is case (b). 
 
Contrary to d , the population of the poor β   has a different effect on the 
innovation rate. In the case of the separating price, if the Gini-coefficient 
increases because the population of the poor β  increases given constant d , 
then the inequality leads to a small market size for the quality good. Hence, 
the monopolistic firm has less profit, and the innovation rate decreases. If a 
country has a relatively even initial income distribution ( ]1,[ ∗∈ ββ ) then 
the monopolist sets the pooling price. Since the market of the quality good 
is the whole society, the population share of the poor does not affect the 
innovation rate.  
 
What is the impact of wealth inequality (β  or d , respectively) on utility? 
From (4.2) and (4.3) we have: 
 
                                     
q
q
x
xu
x
xu
∆+∆=∆
∆=∆
2
2
2
1
1
1
                                              ( 4.25 ) 
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In a steady state, the consumption of standard goods is constant ( 0=∆x ), 
and qkq )1( −=∆ φ . Hence, we have )1( −=∆ kU ρφ . The higher the 
innovation rate, the larger the increase in the utility is. Redistribution from 
the rich to the poor ( d  increases) decreases the wealth inequality, hence, the 
aggregate supply of efficient labor increases. This is the supply-side effect. 
What is the demand-side effect of this redistribution? If ∗< dd , the 
monopolist sets separating price. Redistribution leads to a decrease in the 
initial wealth of the rich, in turn, a less monopolistic profit. Consequently, 
the research sector employs less efficient labor units. Recalling that the 
quality good sector needs always a  units of efficient labor and the 
education sector needs same efficient labor as long as the aggregate 
investment of human capital keeps constant, more efficient labor units are 
shifted from the research sector to the standard good sector. This 
reallocation of efficient labor among different sectors is the demand-side 
effect. Sum up, consumers enjoy a higher utility level in the short run, but 
the long run growth rate of the utility is lower than before because of a 
lower innovation rate. If ∗> dd , we have a pooling equilibrium. In contrast 
to the separating case, redistribution from the rich to the poor can induce a 
higher price of quality goods and more monopolistic profits. Consequently, 
the research sector has a higher incentive to employ more efficient labor 
units and a higher innovation rate will be achieved. It is not a priori clear 
whether consumers have more or less consumption of standard goods in a 
new pooling equilibrium. It depends on which effect is dominant, the 
supply-side effect or the demand-side effect.  
 
4.5 An example: China 
 
Because d  and β  have different effects on the innovation rate, in 
particular, their effects offset each other in the separating equilibrium, the 
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Gini-coefficient has no overall effect on economic growth. In this sense, it is 
important for us to decompose the Gini-coefficient in the empirical research. 
The different effects of the relative poorness and the population share of the 
poor imply the different policy recommendation. In a country where the 
separating equilibrium is overwhelming and the goal of government policy 
is to achieve both an increase in economic growth and a decrease in 
inequality, one should consider decreasing the population share of the poor 
but not redistributing from the rich to the poor.  
 
Chinese experience in the last two decades bears witness to this prediction. 
In China, the disparity between urban and rural residents is assured by the 
Chinese household registration (Hukou) system, (Yang and Zhou 1999). 
Lacking free migration between urban and rural areas, the Chinese 
government has invested more in public goods such as education, social 
insurance and infrastructure, in the cities than in the rural areas since 1949. 
This can be stylized by assuming V  to be the public social wealth.21 The 
government implements an urban-biased redistribution policy, (Yang 1999). 
Hence, the urban resident is rich and the rural resident is poor. The goal of 
Chinese reform above all is to have a high economic growth rate. 
Government can control both the population share of the poor through the 
Hukou system and the relative poorness of the poor through the 
redistribution policy.  
 
After the 1980s, this Hukou system was relaxed. However, it has never been 
abandoned. As a result the urban population (the rich) increased 
dramatically from 21% in 1982 to 36% in 2000. At the same time, the 
                                                 
21 It reflects the central planning economy in China before reform, at which time almost all 
firms were state-owned. Hence, the Chinese government did have the power to distribute 
V  between urban and rural. Since 1980, the power of this distribution diminishes as more 
and more firms went private. However, many state-owned firms remain, particularly, in the 
monopolistic branches and capital intensive industries.  
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relative income of rural residents ( y
yp ) decreased from 0.76 (1980) to 
0.61 (2000), (China Statistical Yearbook 2002). Combining these results, 
Chinese firms have a great incentive to invent better quality goods and set 
prices at the separating level. The evidence for separating price strategy lies 
in the fact that the most new and better quality goods are sold in Chinese 
cities. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2002, Chinese average 
growth rate of GDP per capita was approximately 9% over the last 20 years. 
Although there are many reasons for the rapid growth, we cannot deny that 
one of them is the high demand for the better quality goods.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the ambiguous relationship between wealth 
inequality and economic growth in a framework of a quality-improving 
growth model. Our contribution is to enhance the analysis of this 
relationship in two ways. First, we argue that the Gini-coefficient, used by 
most empirical research in this branch, can include too many variables 
which have diverse effects on economic growth. Therefore, we need to 
decompose the Gini-coefficient into different variables. The current model 
supplies an example that divides the Gini-coefficient into the relative wealth 
of the poor and the population share of the poor. We have shown that they 
induce a contradictory effect under certain conditions. This result indicates 
that we need to investigate not only the Gini-coefficient, but also the shape 
of wealth distribution. The empirical research on the base of the Gini-
coefficient cannot generate a clear relationship between wealth distribution 
and economic growth. In particular, we may be unable to draw from such 
simple empirical studies recommendations on redistribution policies for 
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achieving a higher economic growth rate as well as a more equal income 
distribution.  
 
Additionally, we have combined two sides of the market within one simple 
model: the supply of production factors and the demand for the consumption 
goods. Thus, in this model, there are two different channels, by which 
wealth distribution can affect economic performance. Whereas the supply-
side effect of wealth inequality is negative on the economic performance, 
the demand-side effect could be positive under certain condition. Hence, 
there is non-linear relationship between the wealth inequality and economic 
growth. This result is partly consistent with the empirical evidence (Chen 
2003), although he uses the Gini coefficient, but not other variables which 
we investigate.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Final Remarks 
 
This thesis emphasizes two important sources of economic growth: political 
institutions and inequality. Since each essay has been summarized in the 
introductory chapter, this final chapter briefly addresses some points for 
future research. 
 
Although national leadership plays a crucial role in economic development 
(Jones et al. 2005), we know little about the precise mechanisms. Chapter 2 
provides a possible way to think about the behavior of dictators in 
developing economies. However, the model is quite simple. We have not 
distinguished between human capital and physical capital investments. 
Hence, it is impossible to know from chapter 2 why the Chinese government 
is willing to invest so much in infrastructure, but not in education. It also is 
a very simple assumption that dictators can influence the economy only via 
social transfers. Barro (2000a) points out the importance of the rule of law 
to economic development. While social transfers can be interpreted as 
public investments and/or subsidy to private investments, the rule of law is a 
commitment to ensure the return of private investments. Although the good 
dictators in East Asia implemented the rule of law, economists have little 
theory to explain why dictators can keep their promise (Acemoglu et al. 
2000).     
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Another way to understand the behavior of dictators is to incorporate more 
variables into their utility function. As a national leader, a dictator does have 
some political interest, e.g., independence of the nation, her status in history. 
The question is why she is concerned about these and how these variables 
influence economic performance. In this sense modern behavioral 
economics might be helpful in understanding the functionality of a 
dictatorship.    
 
It also is of interest to compare economic performance in both dictatorial 
and democratic countries. With a fast growing economy, China, as the 
biggest dictatorial developing country, showed somewhat of an advantage 
compared to the greatest democratic developing country, India, in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Does this imply that a dictatorship is better off than a democracy 
when considering developing economies? Since India began to grow fast in 
the last 5 years, the question arises again: does democracy help India to 
catch up with China? Can democratic India grow under more stable 
conditions and thereupon benefit the poor more than China? In order to 
understand the fast growth in China and India, we need more theories with 
regard to political institutions and economic growth.  
 
Wealth inequality is another important source of economic growth. While 
traditional economic research focuses on the supply-side effect of 
inequality, we stress the demand-side effect. However, this is not the whole 
picture. Inequality can also affect political institutions, and in turn, 
economic performance. The interaction between political institutions and 
inequality will be helpful to understand the political transition and economic 
growth. 
 
Last but not least, we need more empirical evidence to support our 
predictions. Some important findings are testable. For instance, both the 
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population share of the poor and the relative wealth of the poor negatively 
affect economic growth. Another interesting point is to test in an 
econometric model whether dictatorial institutions induce a higher variance 
in growth rates. These aspects are all important for future research. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 2.1: 
 
The payments of citizens whose ability over goodaˆ  are:  
    
                     )
2
)1)(1((A 
2
t τ
τλτλτλ −
−−−−=−= NeaNAsaNP tgoodgoodat  
 
In order to determine the political attitude of this group of citizens, we 
should check whether goodsaN −τλtA  is positive or not.  
 
For the person with ability 1, the payment is: 
    
  0)
2
)1)(1()1(()
2
)1)(1((
22
,1 >=−
−−−−−≥−
−−−−= ττ
τλλτλτ
τλτλ NANNNANeNAP tttgoodt  
 
Hence, the citizen with ability 1 always supports democracy. 
 
For the person with ability goodaˆ , the payment is: 
   
)2)(1(
)1)(1)(1()1()
2
)1)(1(ˆ(
2
,ˆ τλ
τλτλλτλ
τ
τλτλ −−
−+−−++−=−
−−−−= NeANeaNAP tgoodtgoodtagood  
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If conditions τλ −> 1
1  and 
1
)1)(1)(1(
−−
−+−−> τλλ
τλτλNe  are satisfied, goodtagoodP ,ˆ  
is negative. It implies that there is )1,ˆ( goodaa ∈∗ , ),ˆ( ∗∈∀ aaa good 0<goodatP  
and ]1,[ ∗∈∀ aa 0≥goodatP . Hence, the citizen ),ˆ( ∗∈∀ aaa good  becomes the 
supporter of the good dictatorship under conditions τλ −> 1
1  and 
1
)1)(1)(1(
−−
−+−−> τλλ
τλτλNe . 
 
Appendix 2.2: 
 
One reason to assume an equally distributed social transfer in democracy is 
that, we cannot know a priori who constitutes the majority. Theoretically, 
50% of the population plus one individual could make up the majority, who 
support the social transfer policy only benefiting them. However, some may 
doubt whether the result of this paper is sensitive to the assumption of 
equally distributed social transfer in a democracy. This appendix shows us 
that results do not change qualitatively, if we assume that the social transfer 
policy in a democracy is same as that in dictatorship, i.e., the individual who 
invests gets social transfer. 
 
Since my model is based on a trade-off between the short run benefit and 
long-run costs for the dictator, we need to show that citizens, in the 
aggregate, still have incentives to revolt under the new group-specific social 
transfer policy. I.e., democracy is still better than a dictatorship. 
 
Analogously, the median vote maximizes his income.  
 
                                 )()1(5.0 5.0,5.0 5.0 t
I
tt eAsINAYMax −+−= τλτ  
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                                 ( )
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aaNA
a
day
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ˆ1
²ˆ²ˆ5.0
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1
0
−
−+=−=
∫ λλττ  
 
If 5.0ˆ >a , i.e., the median voter doesn’t invest, his maximization problem 
reduces to:   
 
                                         )1(5.0,5.0 τ
τ
−= NAY ttMax  
 
The first order condition is:       05.0,5.0 <−=∂
∂
NA
Y
t
t
τ  
 
Hence  01, =demτ , 01, =dems  and ( ) gooddem aN
ea ˆ
1
ˆ 1, <−= λ .                  
 
If  5.0ˆ ≤a , the median voter invests. His maximization problem is then: 
 
                          ( ) tttt eAa
aaNANAYMax −−
−++−=
)ˆ1(2
²ˆ²ˆ)1(5.0,5.0
λλττλ
τ
 
 
The first order condition is:                 05.0 >∂
∂
τ
Y
   
 
Hence, ττ =2,dem  and 02, >dems . Because there is no taxation, the 
individual who invests gets more social transfer in a democracy than in a 
dictatorship. Thus, gooddem aa ˆˆ 2, < .                               
          
Summarizing, in a democracy the investment ratio is always greater than in 
a dictatorship. I.e., the citizens in aggregate can earn more in democracy. 
Hence, they are willing to revolt if possible. The dictator must face the 
 120
trade-off between the short run economic benefit and the earlier 
democratization in the long-run. Our result would not change qualitatively. 
 
Appendix 3.1 
 
First, it is easy to see that both qualities cannot be sold to the same 
consumer because of the assumption that consumers will choose the better 
quality if both generate the same utility. There are two possible cases: the 
best quality good is sold either to the rich or to the poor. In the first case the 
second best good cannot be sold to the rich but to the poor. This is the 
separating equilibrium. The other case is the pooling equilibrium, in which 
the best quality good is accepted by the poor, i.e., the utility of the poor 
from consuming the best quality good is larger than that of the second best 
quality: 
 
                            1100 ln)ln(ln)ln( −− +−−≥+−− qPeyqPey pp  
                            0))(1( 10 ≥+−−−⇔ −PkPeyk p         and  pr yy >  
                            0))(1( 10 >+−−−⇒ −PkPeyk r  
                            1100 ln)ln(ln)ln( −− +−−>+−−⇔ qPeyqPey rr  
 
The rich prefer the best quality good to the second best one, too. Hence, in 
the pooling equilibrium the second best quality good is not sold. 
 
Appendix 3.2 
 
1. Pooling: Given the price of 1−q  the firm of 0q  will charge his price as 
high as possible. Hence, the possible equilibria lie on the line CD of Figure 
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3.1. Suppose 0P  is higher than k
waey
k p
+−

 − )(11 , then firm 1−q  can 
charge a price higher than marginal cost and attract all poor consumers. It is 
the separating case. This contradicts the pooling assumption. Hence, the 
single stage pooling equilibrium is waP
k
waey
k
P p =+−

 −= −10 ,)(11 . We 
should also consider if other possible equilibria can be sustained through 
any punishment in a repeated game. Because here the lowest profit which 
firm 1−q  can earn is zero, it is impossible to punish him because what the 
firm has in equilibrium is also zero. Hence, above stage equilibrium is also 
the equilibrium for the whole repeated game. 
 
2. Separating: The best-reply function of the best quality firm is 
k
Pey
k
P r 10 )(
11 −+−

 −= , which is the line AB in Figure 3.1. For the poor 
the utility if he consumes 1−q  is strictly greater than that if he consumes 0q  
given above best-reply function. It implies that firm 1−q  has an incentive to 
increase its price without losing its consumers. Hence, the single stage 
equilibrium is point B in Figure 1. However, for the whole repeated game, 
other points on AB can also be sustained as equilibria because the firm 0q  
can punish the other to set the pooling price (then firm 1−q  can earn only 
zero profit) in future if firm 1−q  increases its price in this stage. Hence, 
theoretically there are many possible separating equilibria. But such 
punishment is in some sense unrealistic because the deviation in  1−P  is not 
able to decrease the profit of the firm 0q . Hence, under the assumption that 
the deviation will not be punished if such deviation does not affect other’s 
profit, we have a single separating equilibrium B. 
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Appendix 3.3 
Denote ED as follows: e
waedVw
dVk
ED ln11
1
ln −

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
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+−−+
−
−
= θ
βθρ .  
Hence, 
β
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e
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We have: 
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−
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1)1(
0 dVke
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0
≥
∂∂
∂∂−=∂
∂
= β
β
ED
e
ED
e ED
 is that 
0≥−−− ρewaew . 
 
Appendix 3.4 
 
            Table 3.5: The impact of d  on ,,, 10 −ππrA  and their weights 
d  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.55 0.6 
rA  11.16 13.38 16.15 19.49 21.55 23.64 
0π  8.34 7.92 7.40 6.82 6.49 6.20 
θφ +1
 
1.18 1.20 1.23 1.27 1.28 1.32 
1−π  0.36 1.05 1.90 2.90 3.50 4.12 
( θφφ +
 
0.48 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 
 
When d  increases, the relative wealth of the rich increases. However, the 
profit of the best quality good decreases because of the decreasing market 
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share β−1 . 1−π  increases because both the market share and the income of 
the poor increase. But in the present value of innovation 0π  has a higher 
weight factor θφ +1  than 1−π  ( )²( θφφ + ). Hence, the net effect of d  on 
the present value of innovation is negative, which impedes the innovation 
rate. 
 
Appendix 4.1 
 
According to the definition of the Gini-coefficient, it is equal to the ratio of 
the areas ACD and ABC. As we normalized AB and BC to 1, we have:  
 
                        
β
ββββ
)1(
)1()1(1
212
d
dd
ABCDofareatheACDofareatheGini
−=
−•+−•−=
•−=•=
  
 
Appendix 4.2 
 
The labor market clearing condition is   
 
                         SxxbanLL rprp +−+++=−+ ))1(()1( ββββ  
 
Substituting (4.1) and budget constraint equations of both periods, we have 
two possible cases: 
 
1) if the monopolist sets the price at the pooling level:  
 
SPy
PyHAHAbanHHa
r
prrpprp
+−−
+−+−−+−++=−++
)))(1(
)())(1()(()1(
0
0
β
βθβθβββ αα
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recall 1=wb , rp HHwS )1( ββ −+=  and waPpool −= 0π : 
 
pool
rp
rprrpprp
Vwn
HH
PyPyHAHAwnHHw
πθ
ββ
ββθβθβββ αα
−+=⇔
−++
−−+−+−−+−+=−+
0
)1(
))(1()())(1()())1(( 00
 
2) if the monopolist sets the price at the separating level: 
 
SPy
wayHAHAbanHHa
r
prrpprp
+−−
+−+−−+−++=−++
)))(1(
)())(1()(()1(
0β
βθβθβββ αα
sepVwn πθ −+=⇔ 0  
 
Summing, we have Vwn θπ += .                                                               
 
Appendix 4.3 
 
Here we show that the effect of d  on L  is positive. Hence, the 
redistribution from the rich to the poor can increase the supply of labor; in 
turn, the innovation rate increases.       
                            
αα ββββ rprp HHaLLL )1()1( −++=−+=  
 
From (4.14) (4.15) (4.16) and λ
wV =∗ , we know 
                           
                          λβ
β
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−
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1
1
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Hence,      
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. 
 
In both extreme cases 0→α  and 1→α , the supply-side effect of 
inequality on growth disappears, i.e., 0→∂
∂
d
L . α  reveals the strength of 
this supply-side effect.  
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